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INTRODUCTION
Tropical fish take on a precarious existence when forced end-
lessly to patrol small cubes and spheres of our living rooms, bed-
rooms, and waiting rooms. One wonders whether they ever realize
the true state of their dependence. Their caretaker, a human, deter-
mines the conditions necessary for their very existence: food, heat,
light, air, waste disposal, and physical protection.
The caretaker may feel in control of her own existence as well.
But is she? An agency, sometimes too large to communicate, dealing
with information often too complex to understand, buffeted by an
ocean of political, financial, and technological pressures, makes daily
decisions concerning her existence. The quality of the air, atmos-
phere, water, and land have been entrusted to this agency and a to
system of regulations. The current state of our environment sug-
gests that neither the agency (the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA)), nor the environmental regulatory system that it administers
has been a good trustee of these essential conditions of life.'
t B.S. 1986, Pennsylvania State University; J.D. Candidate 1990, University of
Pennsylvania. The author would like to thank his wife Christine for her support and
patience and God for the inspiration to attempt change.
I The state of the environment as we end the twentieth century might be
considered desperate. The air we breathe has become a sink containing more than
100 toxic compounds. See Easterbrook, Cleaning Up, NEWSWEEK, July 24, 1989, at 28
(stating that U.S. industry has confessed to pumping 2.7 billion pounds of toxic
chemicals into the air each year); Karlen & Hager, Pollution: Now the Bad News,
NEWSWEEK, Apr. 8, 1985, at 26 (discussing congressional survey indicating that air
pollution from emission of toxic chemicals is worse than ever before); Mlot,
Multimedia Maneuvers: Shifting Tactics for Controlling Shifting Pollutants, 127 Sci. NEWS
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This Comment sets out to examine this inadequate institutional
management of our environment. It also proposes a new approach.
The argument derives from a recognition that our regulatory, envi-
124, 124-25 (1985) ("Most air today holds a mix of about 100 organics and other
toxic chemicals that may or may not be harmful at their parts-per-billion and parts-
per-trillion levels."); see also Commoner, The Environment, THE NEW YORKER, June 15,
1987, at 46, 46-47 (1987) (compiling statistics gathered from Environmental
Protection Agency Annual Reports for the years between 1975 and 1985 and
comparing the small improvements in levels of air pollutants since the 1970s with the
failure to reduce other pollutants); Mansnerus, How the Lung Reacts to Ozone Pollution,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1988, at D7, col. 1 (describing one medical theory that high
concentrations of ozone, increasing in urban air, can cause scar tissue to develop in
human lungs, making breathing more difficult); Shaw, Air Pollution by Particles, 257
Sci. AM. 96, 96 (1987) (stating that acidic particles in the air damage man-made
structures and plant and animal life).
Human activity has fouled the upper atmosphere as well. See Nightline: The
Greenhouse Effect (ABC television broadcast, Sept. 7, 1988) (transcript on file at
University of Pennsylvania Law Review) (discussing the effects of global warming due
to the massive increase of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere resulting from the
industrial revolution); Greenhouse Effect, INSIDE EPA's ENVTL. POL'Y ALERT, Aug. 24,
1988, at 1 (predicting sea level rises of up to fifteen inches by 2025 and an eventual
eighty percent loss of U.S. coastal wetlands as a result of the greenhouse effect);
Commoner, supra at 53 (stating that if the ozone layer is sufficiently depleted,
incidences of skin cancer will increase).
The water, too, seems to be ever more hazardous. See Levine, Watergate: Earth,
OMNI, Feb. 1988, at 20 (suspended within the nation's groundwater lurk "[m]ore
than 200 potential contaminates-from industrial solvents and pesticides to cleaning
preparations and septic tank degreasers."); Sun, Pesticides to be Judged on Leachability,
239 SCIENCE 1086 (1988) (repeating recent EPA findings that "[a]bout 50 to 60
pesticides, many of them suspected carcinogens, have been detected in the ground
water of 30 states"); see also Taylor, Clean Water: Adding up the Balance Sheet, U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REP., Feb. 16, 1987, at 22, 22 (stating that after $40.5 billion of federal
money and approximately $25 billion of state and local funds were spent to clean
America's waterways, some 47,000 miles have markedly improved while 311,000
miles of water have worsened or remained unchanged).
The land itself suffers pollution comparable to that affecting our air,
atmosphere, and water. See Marshall, High Selenium Levels Confirmed in Six States, 231
SCIENCE 10 (1988) (quoting a study performed by the Sacramento Bee which
indicated that high selenium levels in 9 western states may be killing and deforming"
'birds, fish, and other wildlife in the SanJoaquin Valley [and] ... poisoning wildlife,
livestock, and even some rural families over thousands of square miles.' ");
Parkinson, Responsible Waste Management in a Shrinking World, ENV'T, Dec. 1983, at 61
(quoting statistics compiled in EPA, FIRST REPORT TO CONGRESS, RESOURCE
RECOVERY AND SOURCE REDUCTION (1973) and TENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (1979) revealing that from the late 1940s
through the early 1970s, the consumption of materials grew faster than the
population, with an increasing percentage of materials consumed as throw-away
goods); U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, ARE WE CLEANING UP?
10 SUPERFUND CASE STUDIES-SPECIAL REPORT 7 (1988) [hereinafter OTA SPECIAL
REPORT] (stating that a recent analysis of superfund toxic waste cleanup sites has
revealed "some disturbing trends among the[ ] problems-trends that compromise
the ultimate protection of human health and the environment .. ").
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ronmental caretaker has not accomplished what Congress asked it to
do: to care for and improve the quality of our environment.2 Nor is
our caretaker, as it is presently conceived, capable ultimately of suc-
ceeding; although small battles have been and may yet be won along
the way.
3
This Comment argues that individuals, if provided with suffi-
cient information concerning the impact of their activities on the
environment and an incentive to use that information in an environ-
mentally efficient manner, are better able to improve and control the
quality of their environment than is a centralized caretaker. To that
end, this Comment develops a structure of a federal pollution con-
trol program that would convert this theory into practical legislative
and societal use.
The Comment proposes an "Environmental Impact Index"
(EII), that would provide consumers with simple, concise, at-a-glance
numerical information concerning the environmental impact of a
product or package during its production, use, and disposal. With
this information, consumers would better be able to make decisions
based on environmental criteria as well as on price and quality.
Linked to this Index, an Environmental Impact Tax (EIT) is sug-
gested as a means by which society can create and control environ-
mentally efficient behavior among consumers. Similar to a national
sales tax, the EIT effectively would charge consumers, not produ-
cers, for the environmental costs of the goods they consume. Con-
sumers would pay for environmental costs just as they now pay for
the costs of production through basic product prices. The overall
program would achieve environmental goals by reducing the
demand for environmentally inefficient goods rather than by altering
the supply, as is attempted by the current regulatory approach and
by most environmental economic proposals.
Part I of this Comment begins with a brief exploration of the
structure of and theories behind current United States environmen-
tal regulatory policy. The analysis then discusses why Congress
chose a regulatory approach to pollution control. The strengths and
weaknesses of the regulatory approach are also identified. Part II
lays the groundwork for the proposed EII/EIT program by examin-
ing the production/pollution process. Through this investigation, a
2 The environmental goals identified by Congress as targets for the federal
government were most sweepingly and elegantly set forth in the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA). See infra notes 6-8 and accompanying
text.
3 See infra notes 36-45 and accompanying text.
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major weakness of the regulatory approach to pollution control is
shown to be its failure to target that sector of the economy that ulti-
mately controls producer behavior, and thus production pollution:
the consumer sector. Part III develops the EII/EIT program by
which environmental decision making can be returned to the individ-
ual consumers, who society will influence to make environmentally
efficient choices. The objective of the program is to return control of
the things of life to us all, for the benefit of us all.
I. THE CURRENT REGULATORY APPROACH TO ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION: ITS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
A. Generally-The Theories, Policies, and Structure of
U.S. Environmental Regulation
"The essence of regulation is a conception that law is the means
by which some notion of the public good is to take precedence over
narrower economic interests."-4 Environmental regulation, unlike
the regulation of specific industries such as the airlines or railroads,
must balance the perceived public good against "the production and
consumption decisions of every citizen and every business firm." 5
The synergistic relation among these actors, woven through the
interlocked environmental media they all share (air, atmosphere,
water, and land), presents environmental regulators with a labyrin-
thian agenda of decisions.
The public good toward which these decisions ultimately must
work was eloquently set forth in the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969.6
The Congress, recognizing the profound impact of man's activity
on the interrelations of all components of the natural environment,
... and recognizing further the critical importance of restoring and
maintaining environmental quality .... declares that it is the con-
tinuing policy of the Federal Government... to use all practicable
4 K. HAWKINS, ENVIRONMENT AND ENFORCEMENT 17 (1984); see also T. McCRAw,
PROPHETS OF REGULATION 302 (1984) ("In regulation, . . . tradeoffs have appeared
most clearly as ways of relieving the persistent tension between the forces seeking to
implement economic efficiency for the broad benefit of American society, and those
dedicated to guaranteeing the observance of legal due process for every ... member
of that society.").
5 C. SCHULTZE, THE PUBLIC USE OF PRIVATE INTEREST 9 (1977); see also B. COOK,
BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS AND REGULATORY REFORM 5 (1988) ("most kinds of social
regulation encompass broad classes of industry and cut across economic sectors").
6 Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-
4347 (1982 & Supp. 1987)).
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means and measures .. to create and maintain conditions under
which man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill
the social, economic, and other requirements of present and future
generations of Americans.
7
The legislature chose to achieve these lofty ends by means of "social
regulation."
8
In current form, environmental regulatory laws "set[ ] up a cen-
tral agency [the EPA] to determine a detailed control strategy for
every polluting source, balancing environmental gains against eco-
nomic costs." 9 Congress anchored the EPA's broad regulatory and
enforcement powers to a rather detailed bulwark of deadlines and
procedures for developing environmental standards.' 0 The stan-
dards form the actual control strategy to be asserted by the EPA and
implemented by the states. These environmental standards may be
viewed as falling into one of the following categories:"
1) Performance standards establish a particular degree of control
without specifying the method to achieve this control. Examples of
such standards can be found in the Federal Clean Water Act12 and
the Clean Air Act.'"
7 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1982).
8 See B. CooK, supra note 5, at 4-5. (stating that social regulation is concerned
with "the achievement of broad social goals with respect to safety, health,
employment fairness, and related issues" while traditional economic regulation
focuses on the control of prices and competition in specific industries).
9 C. SCHULTZE, supra note 5, at 53.
10 See R. MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR
ACT 7 (1983).
11 The following two categories of regulatory standards were set forth in
Anderson, Human Welfare and the Administered Society: Federal Regulation in the 1970s to
Protect Health, Safety, and the Environment, in ENVIRONMENTAL AND OCCUPATIONAL
MEDICINE 835, 846-48 (W. Rom ed. 1983).
12 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982 & Supp. 1986). The Act authorizes the states
or the EPA Administrator to establish the particular performance standards to be
achieved and also sets forth a timetable for their achievement. See 33 U.S.C.
§§ 131 (b), 1313 (1982). The standards developed must "reflect the greatest degree
of effluent reduction which the Administrator determines to be achievable through
application of the best available demonstrated control technology." 33 U.S.C.
§ 1316 (a)(1) (1982).
Effluent limitations are also set by the states and/or the Administrator on a
particular timetable according to the "best available technology economically
achievable." 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (b)(2)(A). The EPA is also required to maintain a list
of toxic pollutants and develop limitations on their discharge according to "the best
technology economically achievable." 33 U.S.C. § 1317 (a)(1), (2) (1982).
13 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982 & Supp. 1987). The Act, like the Federal
Clean Water Act, utilizes standards (national ambient air quality standards) and
point source emissions limitations to achieve its goals. Under the Act the EPA
Administrator is required to develop and maintain a list of air pollutants "which may
1989]
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Performance standards, particularly effluent (water) and emis-
sion (air) standards, generally establish output limits for a type of
source. Effluent and emission discharge limitations, on the other hand,
place restrictions on the amount of a pollutant a particular source may
discharge into the surrounding environment and will be coordinated
among all discharges in order to achieve the overall performance
standard.
2) Ambient Standards focus not on the source of the output but
on the level of pollutants that the environment surrounding the
source may contain.4 Ambient standards exist for both air and water
and typically identify the maximum concentration of a particular con-
taminant that may exist in a particular area: for example, "the mean
annual total phosphate concentration in the Colorado River from the
Utah border to Willow Beach must not exceed 0.04 milligrams of
phosphate per liter." 5
Virtually the entire U.S. pollution control effort rests on per-
formance standards, discharge limitations, and ambient standards.'
6
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare." 42 U.S.C.
§ 7408(a)(1)(A) (1982). Air quality criteria on each pollutant must then be
established. See 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(2) (1982).
"The national ambient air quality standards [42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1982)]
determine the concentrations of pollutants allowed in the surrounding air." S.
WOLF, POLLUTION LAW HANDBOOK 51 (1988). Limitations placed on the sources of
these pollutants are then used to achieve the relevant air quality standard. See 42
U.S.C. §§ 7411, 7412 (1982) (dealing with standards for new stationary sources and
for hazardous air pollutants). The limitations must comport with those "achievable
through the application of the best technological system of continuous emission
reduction." 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (a)(1)(C).
States are required to enforce the standards through a state implementation plan
to be approved by the Administrator. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7407(a), (c), 7410 (1982). The
state implementation plans are used to achieve the ambient standards within air
quality control regions which the Administrator and the states establish. 42 U.S.C.
§ 7407.
14 See S. WOLF, supra note 13, at 53.
15 See Anderson, supra note 11, at 847.
16 The statutes responsible for the bulk of the effort toward pollution reduction
and control are: the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982 & Supp. 1987);
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376
(1982 & Supp. 1986); the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629
(1982 & Supp. 1987); the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j-10 (1982
& Supp. 1987); and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6901-6987 (1982 & Supp. 1987). Each of these statutes requires that standards
and limitations be established. For an overview and analysis of the standard-setting
operation of each of the above statutes, see S. WOLF, supra note 13, at 1-2, 47-48,
104-06, 133-37, 183-84.
Design standards, behavioral standards, and informational standards are utilized
to achieve certain environmental goals; however, they are not the primary means of
implementing the environmental policy of the United States. See, e.g., Anderson,
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In addition to the goal of realizing a cleaner environment, these stan-
dards and regulations "were [specifically] adopted to force environ-
mental values to be considered in all actions .... to force technology
to meet [these] standards, and to increase the number and size of
areas to be protected from improper use."17
To implement and enforce environmental standards, the EPA
must monitor, either directly or indirectly, both producer discharges
and the surrounding environment. The EPA must also take steps to
achieve compliance with the standards once violations are discov-
ered.1" The legislature adopted this approach to accomplish the
environmental protection and cleanup objectives strongly voiced in
the late 1960s and early 1970s. The remainder of this Part discusses
why the legislature chose such a regulatory system to accomplish our
environmental goals and then points out the strengths and weak-
nesses of this approach.
B. Why did the Legislature Choose a Regulatory Approach?
Environmental regulation is about risk. Public perception of
risk relates closely to catastrophe and crisis, and... [the people's
representatives in government] reflect[ ] that perception. So gov-
ernment is far more likely to act to prevent the repetition of an
event which is unlikely to recur rather than one which certainly
will....
The Clean Air Act [in England] is ... [an] example of how
catastrophe can produce swift action. For years . . . there
descended upon London in the winter from time to time an appal-
ling sulphurous smog.... Every time this happened-and it was
practically every winter- over 40,000 elderly people died.
And then in 1952, the great national cattle show was held in
supra note 11, at 846-48 (stating that discontent with design standards and the
sometimes unrealistic attempts at behavioral standards lead regulators to prefer non-
"soft" solutions such as performance standards).
17 Belsky, Environmental Policy Law in the 1980's: Shifting Back the Burden of Proof,
12 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 4 (1984).
Is The EPA administers federal programs to control air, water, solid waste,
pesticide, and noise pollution. It establishes and enforces emission, effluent, and
disposal standards; assists state and local governments in their pollution control
efforts; monitors and evaluates environmental quality; and conducts research and
demonstrations related to improving or maintaining environmental quality. In
addition, the Agency reviews and comments on the environmental impact of the
actions of other federal agencies, regulates the dumping of materials into the oceans,
and regulates the manufacture, distribution, use, and disposal of chemical substances
that may be hazardous to the environment. See C. REESE, DEREGULATION AND
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 282 (1983).
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London. The prize cow of all England had been awarded her
rosette, and the runner-up, and the third prize winner; and there
was great rejoicing in the land. Then the smog came down, and in
the morning they were all dead. It was under the pressure of that
catastrophe, not the continuous experience of 40,000 human
deaths year in, year out, which gave rise to the Clean Air Act of
1956 .... 19
Although the United States cannot claim such an odd stimulus
for its environmental legislation, we too experienced a torqued chain
of events that towed the legislature into action under swelling public
opinion.2 ° As American society began to recognize the decay of the
environment in the early 1970s, a new "environmental ethic"
emerged based on the notion that "man must make peace with the
environment, preserve and conserve it so that future generations will
not suffer disastrous backlashes from current human excesses."
2 '
Society demanded governmental consideration of this ethic and a
response to the environmental horrors that instigated it.
The government did react. Three interdependent factors led
the government to choose a regulatory approach: history/tradition,
timing, and assumptions concerning the nature of the ailments
afflicting the environment.
1. History/Tradition
The legislative response to the problems industrialization
brought in the nineteenth century foreshadowed the environmental
19 Nathan, The Role of Law and Lawyers in Environmental Regulation, 8 ENVTL. L.Q.
NEWSL., Summ. 1987, at 1, 1-2.
20 Rachel Carson's Silent Spring informed the public of the environmental costs
of progress. See Russell, Environmental Protection for the 1990s and Beyond, ENV'T, Sept.
1987, at 12, 13. The Denora disaster of 1948 frightened urban America when 20
people were killed and nearly half a town became ill from air pollution. See id.
Images of the Cuyahoga River, ablaze as it poured into nearly dead Lake Erie,
signaled deep trouble in industry's relationship with the environment. See id. at 14.
Ultimately, Earth Day in 1970 pushed the government to act. See id "Congress
Recognized that it is possible to pressure the environment so severely that it will
backlash on man." Manley, Federalism and Management of the Environment, 19 URB. LAw.
661, 662 (1987).
The same process continues: "Traditionally ecological legislation passes in the
wake of some mobilizing event: Superfund after Love Canal, the toxic-disclosure law
after Bhopal." Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 32.
21 Manley, supra note 20, at 662; see also Novick, The 20-Year Evolution of Pollution
Law: A Look Back, 4 ENVTL. FORUM, Jan. 1989, at 12, 14 (stating that a system of law
and institutions has implemented a new environmental ethic). For a comprehensive
discussion of this environmental ethic, see the various essays collected in ETHICS AND
THE ENVIRONMENT (D. Scherer & T. Attig eds. 1983).
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legislation of the 1970s. The virtually unlimited power over inter-
state transportation the railroads amassed in the late nineteenth cen-
tury resulted in public demand for governmental control of rates and
tariffs.22 The legislature, balancing such control against the need for
a healthy railroad industry, developed the Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC) "to direct and control [the railroads], and [this]
governance as a practical matter implied not merely legislative power
or simply executive power, but whatever power might be required to
achieve the desired results."2
Congress created the ICC to achieve the public good of ensur-
ing reasonable transportation costs.2 4 Thus, the task of the ICC was
simply economic. Congress subsequently used this regulatory tech-
nique of governance to compel disclosure and publicity of certain
dealings (SEC), protect industries (ICC, FCC), and contain monopo-
lies and oligarchies (FPC, FTC, Department ofJustice Antitrust Divi-
sion).25 By the 1960s, the legislature had come to rely upon
administrative regulatory governance whenever large, complex,
politically volatile issues arose that called for "tradeoffs between the
good of the whole society, on the one hand, and the rights of the
individual, on the other."
26
As the demand for safer products, better working conditions,
and a cleaner environment began to build, the lawmakers adopted
the same approach that successfully had controlled more industry-
specific economic problems decades earlier. Lawmakers saw the
public demand for environmental quality and workplace safety to be
similar to its earlier demands for reasonable prices. A regulatory sys-
tem to develop and enforce safety, performance, and effluent stan-
dards could, in effect, mirror the system already used to develop and
enforce economic standards. The lawmakers felt that they needed
only to adjust details of the system to correct faults critics had identi-
fied in earlier regulatory schemes. These critics had complained of
"agency capture" by the industries being regulated, limited judicial
review, and the absence of specific statutory standards and guide-
lines for administrators to follow.
27
22 SeeJ. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 9-10 (1938).
23 Id. at 10.
24 See P. AREEDA & L. KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS PROBLEMS, TEXT CASES 49-
50 (1988).
25 See T. McCRAw, supra note 4, at 301.
26 Id. at 302.
27 See R. MELNICK, supra note 10, at 7-9 & n.12.
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2. Timing
While a historical reliance upon regulatory problem-solving
contributed to Congress's choice of a regulatory approach to envi-
ronmental problems, the timing of events also played a major role.
As the social clamor for "somebody to do something about the envi-
ronment" reached its peak on Earth Day in 1970, the pressure on
political representatives to act swiftly became clear.28 The environ-
ment became a hot political issue for politicians on all levels. 29 The
pace of response quickened so much that only two months after
Earth Day President Nixon proposed the establishment of the EPA.30
The perceived need for swift action convinced politicians that regula-
tory approaches that had already succeeded in controlling business
would provide the quickest, surest means to meet political demands
regarding the environment.
3. Assumptions Concerning the Nature of
Environmental Problems
The final factor favoring a regulatory solution to environmental
problems was a set of assumptions surrounding the nature of the
problem itself. First, many people believed that society, technicians,
and legislators knew what the bad pollutants were and at what levels
they became menacing or dangerous. 3 Second, they believed that
they had the ability to measure the presence of these pollutants in
the environment with reasonable efficiency.3 2 Finally, they believed
that they could reduce the presence of these pollutants to safe levels
within a reasonably short time at reasonable costs3 3 through
"agency-forcing" and "technology-forcing" standards.34
These three assumptions resemble assumptions underlying eco-
nomic regulations: that one may determine fair and more efficient
prices or business structures; that one can measure prices and a busi-
28 See Sagoff, The Principles of Federal Pollution Control Law, 71 MINN. L. REV. 19, 27
(1986).
29 See Russell, supra note 20, at 14; see also Ruckelshaus, Environmental Risks and
Liabilities-Identification, Assessment and Management, 24 Hous. L. REV. 11, 16 (1987).
30 See Russell, supra note 20, at 14.
31 See Ruckelshaus, supra note 29, at 17.
32 See id.
33 See id.
34 See Sagoff, supra note 28, at 19 & n.3, 20 & n.4. (noting that "agency-forcing"
laws force the government to achieve a goal and that "technology-forcing" laws or
regulations compel polluters to develop technology that will result in satisfaction of
certain standards).
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ness structure's impact on the economy; and that through price con-
trols, licenses, and business constraints, government can achieve a
more efficient and fair economy. These assumptions had served well
when applied to individual industries. Congress thus thought that
the only thing needed to achieve environmental goals across all
industries was a strong federal enforcement program.
35
All of these factors-history/tradition, timing, and certain
assumptions-contributed to the ultimate decision to meet environ-
mental goals with a regulatory approach. The next section examines
the wisdom of that decision.
C. Strengths and Weaknesses of the Environmental Regulatory Approach
1. Strengths
Centralized regulations and standards, like those currently pre-
scribed by the legislature, offer two significant categories of benefits
in solving environmental problems.
a. Control Over Specifically Identified Harmful Substances
Environmental regulation's greatest achievements in pollution
control have been reductions of specific toxins in tle environment.
For example, ambient lead concentrations have decreased 79 per-
cent in ten years, 36 and toxic quantities of mercury, PCBs, and DDT
have also been significantly reduced. 7 These achievements show
that "[r]egulation succeeds most easily when its purposes are either
plainly economic or plainly ethical."3" Environmental regulations
targeting specific toxins "stand squarely in the tradition of legislation
that seeks to control and eliminate moral evils."
39
The American Bar Association incorporated this lesson into its
"rules of thumb" guide to regulatory efficiency: "Classical standard-
setting is needed to protect the public by controlling dangerous con-
ditions and substances, but where possible in dealing with problems
... (such as environmental pollution... ) less restrictive tools (such
as taxes . . .) should be considered."40
35 See Ruckelshaus, supra note 29, at 17.
36 See Russell, supra note 20, at 14.
37 See Commoner, supra note 1, at 57.
38 Sagoff, supra note 28, at 78.
39 Id at 79 (footnote omitted). Similarly plainly ethical regulations are those
banning child labor, discrimination, and the possession of automatic weapons. See id
40 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON LAW AND THE ECONOMY,
FEDERAL REGULATION: ROADS TO REFORM 1 (1979).
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"Evil-targeting" regulations succeed for the same reasons that
most criminal laws result in effective control of unwanted behavior.
Control of unwanted behavior is successful when enforcers have a
clear objective, when enforcer-sanctioning of the activity is rarely
permitted because of the clearly harmful consequences of the behav-
ior, when there is a clear rule, when there is a lack of ambivalence by
the controllers, and when the enforcers view the goal as attainable
and possess the tools to achieve it. 4 Absolute bans on lead in gaso-
line or the use of DDT as a herbicide, anchored in public acceptance,
are successful because they work within these prerequisites of regu-
latory efficiency.
b. Benefits of Uniformity
Another strength of centralized environmental regulation is that
the uniformity it creates decreases the likelihood of "forum shop-
ping" among geographical regions. Centralized regulation also
allows polluters better to predict the consequences of their actions.
4 2
Emission and effluent limitations and standards based on the "best
available technology" generally apply across an entire range of simi-
lar polluters, and are successfully imposed on these polluters.
4 3
Continual judicial review, "notice and comment" rulemaking,
and the processes of centralized agency decision making ensure con-
sistency and predictability of results.4 4 Some commentators have
even argued that these benefits of uniformity not only increase pre-
dictability, but decrease pollution while augmenting producer
wealth. They argue that polluters are forced to decrease production
in order to meet pollution standards, resulting in a reduction of sup-
ply that drives up prices and profits.4 5
2. Weaknesses
The benefits of the current regulatory approach to pollution
41 See K. HAWKINS, supra note 4, at 7-15, 32-35.
42 See Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform
Standards and "Fine-Tuning" Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1271 (1985).
But see Kolstad, Uniformity Versus Differentiation in Regulating Externalities, 14 J. ENVrL.
ECON. & MGMT. 386, 398 (1987) ("Unquestionably, uniform regulation is less
efficient than differentiated regulation .... ").
43 See Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333,
1336 (1985) (asserting that the best available technology controls have a
disproportionate impact on new factories).
44 See Latin, supra note 42, at 1271.
45 See Maloney & McCormick, A Positive Theory of Environmental Quality Regulation,
25J. L. & ECON. 99, 99-100 (1982).
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control are almost entirely offset by three broad categories of
problems.
a. The Task of Environmental Cleanup and Protection is Too Complex for
Centralized Regulation
To administer its environmental regulations, Congress has
"force[d] a central control agency [the EPA] to make thousands of
decisions resting on detailed knowledge it cannot possibly have and,
even less, keep up with over time."'4 6 This structural flaw is critical
and accounts for much of the lack of progress toward a cleaner envi-
ronment. For example, the EPA administers nine extremely detailed
statutes that at times pit the quality of one environmental medium
against that of another.
4 7
While the regulatory system's greatest strength is in reducing
specific substances in the environment,48 most environmental regu-
lations are not so narrowly targeted. The great majority of regula-
tions are aimed at achieving standards of quality for hundreds of
different geographic regions, determining and reaching optimum
levels for hundreds of different pollutants, and monitoring and con-
trolling thousands of different pollution point sources.49 Effective
environmental regulation is hampered further by disjointed goals,
ambivalence, restrictions on enforcement, and the recognition that
pollution is a "necessary evil that must be tolerated, at least to some
extent" to allow society's continued growth.50
46 C. SCHULTZE, supra note 5, at 53; see also Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 43, at
1336-37 (noting the massive burden placed on the EPA in order for it to make
decisions on hundreds of thousands of pollution sources); Harnish, The Self-Help
Approach to Environmental Protection, or, Power to the People Revisited, 86 DicK. L. REV.
647, 650 (1982) ("The sheer magnitude of the task makes it inconceivable to expect
comprehensive monitoring of the actions of potential polluters.") (footnote omitted).
When the EPA proposed one particular new rule, 192 commentators showed up at
29 public meetings, generating 300 pages of comment raising "400 discrete issues,
each requiring an EPA response." The EPA's defense of the rule "comprised 300
pages of response, 800 pages of economic analysis performed at a cost of $600,000,
and 500 pages of related analysis on regulatory impact." Costle, Brave New Chemical.
The Future Regulatory History of Phlogiston, 33 ADMIN. L. REV. 195, 199 (1981).
47 See Morgenstern & Sessions, Weighing Environmental Risks: EPA's Unfinished
Business, ENV'T, Jul.-Aug. 1988, at 15, 15 (describing the problem of conflicting
environmental statutes).
48 See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
49 See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 43, at 1336-37 (describing the
information gathering burden of formulating controls for hundreds of thousands of
pollution sources); Morgenstern- & Sessions, supra note 47, at 16 (describing
problems with setting goals).
50 Sagoff, supra note 28, at 79.
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Not only is the EPA responsible for decision making on remark-
able complex problems, but the system Congress designed to imple-
ment EPA regulations places responsibility for prescribed actions in
the hands of the private sector and state and local governments.5 l
Thus, even if the EPA can assemble the information necessary to
make a credible decision concerning a certain matter, implementa-
tion of that decision is uncertain because of the possibility of this
"regulatory slippage. ' 52
Just gathering enough information" to implement the centralized
regulatory system is difficult and costly. Physically gathering and
analyzing scientific, engineering, biological, toxicological, medical,
and economic information for all potential pollutants is one cost.53
Another cost is the billions of dollars wasted annually because the
EPA cannot identify and utilize variations among geography, indus-
tries, and factories to create the most economically efficient means of
pollution control.54 Finally, there is the cost of conflict resolution,
which encompasses both trial and rulemaking expenses.55 Under the
direct regulatory system, "it is often more cost-effective for industry
to 'invest' in such litigation rather than to comply."
56
In addition to these costs, centralized environmental regulation
is also hampered by political friction.5 7 The EPA must respond to
both legislative and executive demands. Often, this is simply impos-
sible.58 Congress's schizophrenic demands, alternately for more
stringent enforcement and then for regulatory leniency, executive
attempts to regulate regulators, 59 and pressures from both polluters
and environmentalists all slow progress toward environmental
51 See Morgenstern & Sessions, supra note 47, at 17.
52 Id. at 17.
53 See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 43, at 1335-38 (reviewing the costs of
regulations based on the best available technology).
54 See id. at 1335.
55 See id. at 1336-37.
56 Id.
57 See Manley, supra note 20, at 662-63; Morgenstern & Sessions, supra note 47,
at 16.
58 See W. GELLHORN, C. BYSE, P. STRAUSS, T. RAKOFF & R. SCHOTLAND,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS 124-47 (8th ed. 1987) (exploring
informal and formal political controls over administrative agencies).
59 See Smith, Environmental Policy Making Under Reagan's Executive Order 12291: An
Introduction, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY UNDER REAGAN'S EXECUTIVE ORDER 3, 4 (V.
Smith ed. 1984) (stating that Executive order 12291 is an "initiative[ ] from the
executive branch of government to control the process of generating new federal
regulations" by requiring that "all new major regulations be subjected to a benefit-
cost analysis before" being acted upon).
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goals.6" Additionally, interstate competition for industry encourages
states to lobby for more lenient standards within their boundaries in
order to attract jobs, defeating the -gains created by uniform
regulation. 1
Moreover, many of the assumptions implicit in Congress's regu-
latory choices62 are incorrect. Although pollutants can be measured,
not all pollutants or the levels at which they become dangerous have
been identified.63 Nor has the EPA been able to clean the environ-
ment quickly through regulations that "force" agencies and technol-
ogies to employ the best available pollution controls. '
All of these factors suggest that the task of environmental pro-
tection is simply too big for centralized management by a classical
regulatory system. The complexity of the environment, the activities
that influence it, and the many variables that must be considered are
simply too complex for a small group of decisionmakers.
b. Enforcement of the Standards Established by the Regulatory System has
been Ineffective
A 1979 study by the General Accounting Office revealed that
twenty-two percent of 921 major air polluters who the EPA believed
were complying with pollution standards were in fact not comply-
60 See, e.g., L. LAKE, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: THE POLITICAL EFFECTS OF
IMPLEMENTATION 1-4 (1982) ("[I]n the process of attempting to implement federal
laws, political relations and institutions are changed in profound ways . . ."
Federalism, the separation of powers, and citizen-government relations may be
altered.).
61 See Manley, supra note 20, at 662-63 (asserting that states try to defeat
environmental goals in the name of short term economic interests).
62 See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
63 See Ruckelshaus, supra note 29, at 17. Of course, scientific knowledge tends to
accumulate as society's particular need for it increases. See, e.g., Carpenter, Ecology in
Court, and Other Disappointments of Environmental Science and Environmental Law, 15 NAT.
RESOURCES LAW. 573, 581 (1983) ("Environmental science has advanced in the ways
it is applied and in the abilities of the scientists it attracts."). Current federal
programs emphasize measuring the quantity of known pollutants discharged from
particular sources or existing in specified geographical areas. See supra notes 13-18
and accompanying text; see also infra notes 73-78 and accompanying text (the
environmental regulatory system has emphasized "end of the pipe" limits on present
levels of wastes rather than waste reduction). Thus, our ability to measure even
minute quantities of known pollutants has increased, while the identity of all.
pollutants and their impacts continues to elude us. In sum, the knowledge needed to
implement various environmental approaches is attainable. The particular approach
chosen ultimately controls the level of scientific knowledge attained within the limits
of technology.
64 See supra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing "forcing" regulations);
supra note I and accompanying text (arguing that the regulatory approach has failed).
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ing.6 5 In 1984, the EPA discovered that water pollution officials
commonly ignored effluent discharges found to violate applicable
standards.6 6 These examples illustrate the impossibility of monitor-
ing thousands of polluters to determine if they comply with EPA reg-
ulations.6 7 Additionally, the recent political trend has been to
emasculate whatever effectiveness the EPA has had in order to stimu-
late economic growth.6 8 Thus even tough standards have had little
impact.
The EPA's arsenal of civil penalties, fines, construction bans,
and criminal sanctions seems unable to win the environmental war.
69
Polluter self-enforcement is one reason. Under the National Pollu-
tant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) and the New Source
Performance Standards (NSPS), an industry must monitor and
report its own performance over time, possibly subjecting itself to
penalties and eliminating many of its own potential defenses. 70 This
self-monitoring approach exacerbates the great gaps in agency
enforcement efforts. One can hardly expect a "criminal" to turn her-
self in each time she discharges more pollution than her permit
68 UNITED STATES GEN. AccT. OFF., IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN CONTROLLING
MAJOR AIR POLLUTION SOURCES 9 (1979) (Report CED-78-165).
66 See Inspector General Finds Water Policy Officially Sanctions Noncompliance, INSIDE
EPA 3 (Mar. 16, 1984).
67 See Harnish, supra note 46, at 650; see also Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 43,
at 1337 (noting that because agencies are faced with high administrative and
compliance costs and a limited budget, strong incentives exist "to limit sharply the
number of substances on the agenda for regulatory action").
68 See Commoner, supra note 1, at 54; see also Belsky, supra note 17, at 4-5 (noting
that the Reagan Administration has changed the "burden of proof" from the
government's obligation to "err on the side of caution" in protecting the
environment, to forcing "those seeking to have controls adopted or enforced or
seeking to restrict development" to "overcome the presumption against such
controls or limitations").
69 See Harnish, supra note 46, at 650 (stating that the EPA has been criticized for
ineffective enforcement, and that "the future of the federal environmental watchdogs
is bleak."); Comment, Prosecuting Corporate Polluters: The Sparing Use of Criminal
Sanctions, 62 U. DET. L. REV. 659, 675 (1985) (noting that civil penalties and modest
fines have done little to stem the increase in pollution, and that criminal sanctions are
rarely employed); Court Holds Utility in Contempt for Burning Coal, N.Y. Times, Sept. 9,
1987, at B3, col. I (reporting state official's assertion that a fine of $250, the
maximum amount permitted by law, was too small to prevent future violations).
70 See Marks, Citizen Enforcement of Environmental Laws, ENV'T, June 1987, at 5, 5,
42. The NPDES, the "heart" of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342 (1986 & Supp. 1989), prohibits effluent discharges into navigable waters
unless authorized by an NPDES permit. See S. WOLF, supra note 13, at 4; see also C.
RUSSELL, W. HARRINGTON & W. VAUGHAN, ENFORCING POLLUTION CONTROL LAws 36
(1986) [hereinafter ENFORCING POLLUTION CONTROL] ("Self-monitoring is by far the
dominant choice [among the states] for dealing with what might be called primary
surveillance, that is, the routine checking of compliance status.").
DISCLOSING ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
allows. Besides the obvious environmental losses, the enforcement
gap leads to industry gains. Capital expenditures on pollution con-
trol, which averaged $4.8 billion a year between 1973 and 1980,
declined to $3 billion in 1983 as a result of lax enforcement.
71
To plug some of the holes, private citizens have tried enforcing
environmental laws using private right of action provisions in envi-
ronmental statutes. These efforts have redressed some of the fail-
ures in agency-enforcement activity, but they cannot make up for
systemic problems within the regulatory approach itself.
72
c. The Environmental Regulatory System Concentrates on "End of the
Pipe" Installation Technology Which Places Upper Limits on
Pollution Rather Than Reducing Pollution in the Long Term
The current regulatory approach has emphasized installing tech-
nology for the short term reduction to established discharge levels of
pollution from particular point sources. 71 "[G]overnment has not
required waste reduction[s]" that would reduce the total amount of
wastes being discharged; instead, it has imposed regulations and
enforcement strategies that control wastes at present levels.74 If the
established standards were environmentally ideal and perfectly
enforceable, this approach would be effective. But this is not the
case. 7' Thus, the current system ignores an entire spectrum of long-
range pollution control problems. These problems are exacerbated
by ineffective enforcement that eliminates any incentive for techno-
logical innovation toward the efficient reduction of pollution.
7 6
The frequently applied "best available technology" standard
creates a direct disincentive to the creation of new pollution reduc-
tion technology, because the availability of better technology would
require new and more stringent regulations.77 Furthermore,
71 See Commoner, supra note 1, at 54.
72 Cf. Harnish, supra note 46, at 663 (stating that citizen enforcers are unlikely to
be very effective due to various legal and practical barriers).
73 See ENFORCING POLLUTION CONTROL, supra note 70, at 2-3.
74 UNITED STATES CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, FROM
POLLUTION TO PREVENTION: A PROGRESS REPORT ON WASTE REDUCTION 1, 5 (1987).
75 See supra notes 65-72 and accompanying text (outlining failures of
environmental regulation).
76 C. SCHULTZE, supra note 5, at 53.
77 See id.; see also R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 352 (3d ed. 1986) ("In
the deliberations before the legislature or agency leading to the formulation of the
standard, the affected industry has an incentive to propose the cheapest pollution
control method, regardless of its efficacy, and to deny the existence of any more
costly devices (even if they are more efficient because of the amount of pollution
eliminated).").
1989]
522 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 138:505
because discharge permits are free and nontransferable, there is no
incentive to reduce wastes below the prescribed level.78 Thus, even
if current standards were enforced perfectly, near current levels of
pollution and technology would remain. Long term advances are
discouraged.
Thus far, this Comment has explored the structure of the cur-
rent legislative approach to the environmental crisis: why it was cho-
sen, its strengths, and its weaknesses. This analysis shows that the
environmental problems we face today will not disappear, nor will
the environmental goals Congress identified in the 1970s be
achieved if we maintain the current environmental regulatory sys-
tem. The successes achieved by that system's strengths are finite and
many already have been realized. The weaknesses of that system
must be addressed in order to halt environmental degradation. The
next two sections of this Comment will develop a proposal of a new
and retooled national pollution-control system. This proposal would
enable society to achieve the environmental goals of the 1970s in the
1990s.
II. SHIFTING THE AIM OF FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY:
TARGETING THE DEMAND FOR ENVIRONMENTALLY INEFFICIENT
GOODS RATHER THAN THE SUPPLY
The current environmental regulatory system has failed because
it targets only a narrow sector of the economy. One must under-
stand the entire environmental problem in order to develop effective
solutions. The following diagram depicts, in rough form, the pro-
duction/consumption/disposal cycle and the points at which pollu-
tants and wastes are encountered.
As indicated in the diagram, pollutants are spun off during a
product's life cycle at four different points: 1) when raw materials
are gathered and industrial products are produced; 2) when the con-
sumable product and the package that contains it are manufactured;
3) when the product is consumed; and 4) when the product and its
package ultimately are discarded.
The United States' government has directed its entire pollution
78 See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 43, at 1341. The plan introduced by
President Bush to amend the Clean Air Act includes an "emissions trading" system
which would place pollution permits on an open market allowing "engineers rather
than regulators to judge which factories can meet standards most efficiently while
adding a profit motive for inventing improved controls." See Easterbrook, supra note
I, at 33.
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control effort at businesses and producers79 (stages 1 and 2 on the
above diagram). Some of the reasons for this choice, and for the
utilization of the regulatory approach in general, were explored ear-
lier.80 The system has failed8" because it does not target the sector
of the economy that controls the use and disposal of products and,
ultimately, producer behavior-the consumer sector.
A. The Economics of the Environment
Basic to the American free market economy is the notion that
the consumption decisions of the "household sector" (consumers)
"represent the single most important component of [the] aggregate
demand for goods and services... ."12 In determining the amount
and type of products or services to produce, given fixed output
prices, business firms will consider two factors: the demand for the
product or service at its prevailing price level and the cost to pro-
duce a particular volume of output.8 At its simplest form, this prin-
ciple can be reduced to: 0 = D / C, where 0 = the amount of
output, D = demand for the output and C = the cost of producing
79 See supra notes 9-18 and accompanying text.
80 See supra notes 19-35 and accompanying text.
81 See supra note 1.
82 R. LOMBRAJ. HERENDEEN & R. TORTO, MONEY AND THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 60
(1980). The other factors in determining aggregate demand include the
consumption decisions of the business, governmental, and foreign sectors. See id. at
262; R. DORNBUSCH & S. FISCHER, MACROECONOMICS 36 (1978).
83 See R. LOMBRA, J. HERENDEEN & R. TORTO, supra note 82 at 88-89; E.
MANSFIELD, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 67-68, 155, 244-46 (1980).
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the output. If demand increases, output increases. If costs increase
so that the amount a firm receives is less than the cost of producing
the product, output decreases. These adjustments, of course,
assume that firms attempt to maximize profits. This analysis shows
that consumers wield great influence over the production decisions
made by business firms.
Determining consumer demand for a product, however, is a
much more complex task than understanding producer supply deci-
sions. A variety of factors including price,84 income, 85 attitudes and
needs,86 habits and loyalties,87 perceptions,88 culture, 89 social
class, 90 and reference groups9 1 all contribute to establishing the
demand for a product or service. Although these factors make deter-
mining demand difficult, influencing demand can be much easier.
The direct regulatory approach currently employed almost com-
pletely ignores the aforementioned market relationships. 92 In fact,
many scholars argue that this approach causes a "market failure"
that may be the cause of our environmental problems.9" Environ-
mental economists reach this conclusion by noting that a perfectly
functioning market is one in which prices allocate all resources
toward their most efficient uses.94 Market failure occurs when there
is a "divergence between the market prices of resources and those
prices that would have to exist if an optimal state of affairs is to be
secured."95
Many environmental resources, however, (such as public water-
courses, the air, the atmosphere, landscape features, and even
silence) are not priced because private ownership rights have not
84 See H. ASSAEL, CONSUMER BEHAVIOR AND MARKETING ACTION 532-40 (191).
85 See E. MANSFIELD, supra note 83, at 134-35.
86 See H. ASSAEL, supra note 84, at 154-7 1.
87 See id. at 50-70.
88 See id. at 102-28.
89 See id. at 263-83.
90 See id. at 295-307.
91 See id. at 316-27.
92 See F. ANDERSON, A. KNEESE, P. REED, R. STEVENSON & S. TAYLOR,
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT THROUGH ECONOMIC INCENTIVES 2 (1978) (hereinafter
IMPROVEMENT THROUGH ECONOMIC INCENTIVES].
93 Practitioners of what is called "environmental economics" typically assert
that direct regulatory systems cause failures of the market to allocate resources and
use the environment in an optimal fashion. Such market failures allow
environmental degradation to continue unchecked. See D. PEARCE, ENVIRONMENTAL
ECONOMICS 1 (1976).
94 See D. PEARCE, supra note 93, at 2.
95 Id.
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been assigned to them.96 The result is that as these resources are
used up through the emission of wastes and pollutants, the producer
or user is not required to take their cost into consideration or pay for
their depletion.97 In terms of the output equation mentioned above,
the producer effectively avoids a significant cost of production. Deci-
sion making and output levels become distorted, resulting in an over
supply of the pollution-causing product and an under supply of envi-
ronmental benefits.98 Economists describe these situations, in which
society in effect subsidizes activities due to market failure, as
"externalities." 99
To correct this market failure, environmental economists often
suggest that legislatures force the internalization of these externali-
ties by imposing a pricing system on environmental resources, charg-
ing producers an amount that would more accurately reflect the true
costs of production, waste disposal, and pollution.' 0 0 In effect, a tax
would be levied on producers to approximate the social costs of pol-
lution.' 0 ' Arguments favoring this approach include: 1) charge sys-
tems are a more cost-effective means of achieving pollution control
because private decision making on the basis of cost is employed,
and operation of the system would require fewer resources; 10 2 and
2) enforcement would be easier and compliance higher because
direct economic incentives to reduce costs would require reductions
96 See IMPROVEMENT THROUGH ECONOMIC INCENTIVES, supra note 92, at 3-4.
97 See id. at 4.
98 See R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
744-45 (4th ed. 1984).
99 See IMPROVEMENT THROUGH ECONOMIC INCENTIVES, supra note 92, at 4.
100 See id. at 5.
101 See P. BURROWS, THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF POLLUTION CONTROL 98-103
(1980); A. KNEESE & C. SCHULTZE, POLLUTION, PRICES AND PUBLIC POLICY 107-09
(1975) (proposing a positive program of pollution control incorporating an effluent
or emission tax); R. POSNER, supra note 77, at 353; Baumol & Oates, The Use of
Standards and Prices for Protection of the Environment, in THE ECONOMICS OF THE
ENVIRONMENT: PAPERS FOR FOUR NATIONS 53, 53 (P. Bohm & A. Kneese eds. 1971).
But see Endres, Do Effluent Charges (Always) Reduce Environmental Damage?, 35 OXFORD
ECON. PAPERS 254, 260 (1983) (stating that firms "may react 'paradoxically' to an
increase in effluent charge rates by increasing emissions"); McHugh, The Potential for
Cost-Increasing Technological Innovation Under a Tax-Based, Economic Incentive Pollution
Control Policy, 61 LAND ECON. 58, 64 (1985) (Stating that charge systems may
"increase the total private cost to firms of meeting regional emission reduction
goals... because the increase in transfer costs outweigh the decrease in true social
resource costs.").
102 See IMPROVEMENT THROUGH ECONOMIC INCENTIVES, supra note 92, at 10.
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in pollution."' 3 More informed private decisions in all sectors of the
economy would benefit society as a whole.
Until now, most proposed economic charge approaches have
sought to achieve environmental quality by targeting only the busi-
ness sector of the economy. Proponents of such charge approaches
assume that most externalities occur during production. The charge
approach alters the cost variable of the producer's output equa-
tion 10 4 in an effort to influence production decisions and create a
more efficient market. The regulatory approach, while addressing
economic factors, also targets only producers by implementing pro-
duction constraints.
10 5
103 See id. at 15-17 (arguing that direct regulation encourages decreasing costs
by increasing pollution activities).
104 See supra text following note 83.
105 The desired effect of each of these approaches can be illustrated graphically:
PRICE MC MCI
PP - -
P
Pc/d
D
Qd QI Q Qc QIQd Q QUANTITY
FIGURE I (monopoly) FIGURE 2 (perfect competition)
The above diagrams represent two firms, one in a monopoly situation and the
other in perfect competition, subject to either the direct regulatory or the charge
approach to pollution control. D represents the consumer demand for a particular
product that, unknown to the consumer and unreflected in price, produces pollution
externalities. MC represents the marginal cost to the firm of producing an additional
unit of the product and does not include the social costs of pollution. MR represents
the marginal revenue received by the sale of one additional unit. In order to
maximize its profits the firm will produce where MR = MC.
In the monopoly situation, the firm will produce Qand charge P, allowing it to
receive more profits than a competitive firm because it can reduce the quantity of the
products it sells while increasing price over the price Pc/D and quantity Qc where the
entire competitive industry for the same product would be required to produce to
maximize its profits. See P. AREEDA & L. KAPLOW, supra note 24, at 16-17 n.33.
In the competitive situation, the firm will produce Qproducts and charge P. P is
fixed for the individual firm if there is perfect competition. Id.
Assuming fixed demand, the charge approach would increase the marginal cost
of producing the product by charging the producer for some of the social costs of
pollution. Thus, the MC curve will shift higher to MCI on each graph. For the
monopoly, prices will increase to P1 as a result of this added cost and quantities will
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Congress has not yet incorporated a charge approach into its
environmental policy. This Comment will not discuss the reasons
for this resistance. Rather, an entirely new approach will be pro-
posed as an alternative to both the existing regulatory system and
the system of charging producers.
B. Adjusting the Demand Side of the Output Equation to Facilitate
Pollution Control
The consumer is an appropriate target of environmental
enhancement legislation because consumer behavior greatly influ-
ences production decisions.' 06 Additionally, consumers themselves
cause pollution while consuming and disposing of products.
Reducing the demand for highly polluting products could pro-
duce a number of environmental benefits. First, it would decrease
aggregate pollutant emissions as either inefficient production
decreased10 7 or more environmentally efficient methods of produc-
decrease to Q1, reflecting more correctly the true cost of the product. For the
perfect competitor, quantities of the pollution-causing product would be reduced,
thereby reducing pollution, while society is compensated for the costs of pollution.
The goal, of course, is to encourage producers to reduce pollution. The system
would have to work in a way that producers could reduce the increase in marginal
costs by reducing pollution. Based on present proposals, devising such a system
would be quite difficult. See R. POSNER, supra note 77, at 354-55 (arguing that an
approach charging producers for the costs of pollution is flawed). The EII/ElT
program discussed infrzi notes 121-183 offers a different solution to this problem.
The current system of imposing regulatory standards affects producers in a way
similar to the charge approach, but society is not financially compensated for
pollution. The EPA requires that producers produce in such a way that pollutants
are reduced. Such a requirement typically increases producer costs, increasing the
firm's MC curve, thus reducing quantity and increasing price. But since reducing
pollution merely means avoiding ineffective fines, there is little economic incentive
for producers to reduce pollution. In fact, a producer can often keep its MC curve
lower by increasing pollution.
A weakness in both these approaches is that they target producers exclusively,
while consumer demand for environmentally inefficient products continues
unchanged. This presses the producer into greater production and greater
pollution.
106 See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
107 Referring to the diagram supra note 105, a decrease in demand would shift
the demand curve downward from D to DI, decreasing the quantity of
environmentally inefficient products to Qd, assuming costs remain unchanged. The
price at which the competitor would be able to sell its products would decrease to Pd.
The converse of these effects, of course, is that if one could increase the demand
for environmentally efficient products, (moving from DI to D), quantities of those
products and their prices would increase as producers reacted. Both the direct and
converse effects would improve the environment.
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tion, use, and disposal were adopted.'1 8 The direct regulatory
approach cannot achieve these results because it fails to address pol-
lution occuring through the use and disposal of products and pack-
ages."0 9 Additionally, targeting the demand component in producer
decisions removes producers from the difficult position in which they
are placed by both the regulatory and charge systems. Under those
systems, producers face the same consumer demands, needs, and
desires regardless of the additional costs of productions that are
imposed. The result is that only one component of consumer
demand-price-may be affected. The other factors of demand 1 0
are left weighing in favor of continued consumption of the same
products, regardless of their environmental impact.
Second, making the demand for products sensitive to the pollu-
tion generated throughout the product's life cycle would provide an
incentive to producers and disposal firms to satisfy that demand by
developing products and disposal methods that meet consumers'
overall desires."' Pollutants would be reduced because of the con-
sumer demand for more environmentally efficient products and
processes.
Third, a system operating within the free market by influencing
consumer demand would be more efficient because a central plan-
ning agency would no longer be making pollution control decisions
based on information that is nearly impossible to gather or assimi-
late." 12 Each producer and consumer would make her own decisions
based on market information that would guide those decisions
toward environmental goals." 3 Moreover, this approach recognizes
that some pollution is an unavoidable by-product of economic and
social progress; individual economic decision making will sometimes
demand that certain products be produced regardless of their envi-
ronmental impact. In those situations, however, costs could be
imposed on the consumer to compensate society for the use and
cleanup of the environment.
Finally, developing demand-driven economic incentives to
encourage compliance with environmental goals greatly reduces the
108 The exact amount of such reductions would depend, in part, upon the
elasticity of demand for the product and the cross-elasticity of demand for substitutes
of the product.
109 See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
110 See supra text accompanying notes 84-91.
111 Producers will always try to market their products so as to meet the needs
and desires of consumers. See H. ASSAEL, supra note 84, at 2-3, 142.
112 See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
113 See supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text.
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difficulties of attempting to force thousands of ambivalent producers
to comply with regulatory standards." 4 If the market in which pro-
ducers sell their goods and services demands that those items be pol-
lution-lean, the need to monitor producers disappears; voluntary
compliance would be more certain.
III. A FEDERAL POLLUTION CONTROL PROGRAM THAT OPERATES
THROUGH INDIVIDUAL DECISION MAKING AND CONSUMER
DEMAND: THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT INDEX /
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT TAX SYSTEM
This section will argue that using consumer demand to help
fight pollution is a legitimate, workable, and necessary solution to
environmental problems. It will begin by considering criticisms to
such an approach.
Professor Latin, defending the current regulatory system, con-
cluded that "decentralized decisionmaking by consumers will prove
very inefficient in the context of environmental consumption."''
1 5
He identified five potential obstacles to an exclusively free market
approach to pollution control: 1) consumers are ignorant of the
environmental consequences of their purchases,116 and the complex-
ity of environmental information prohibits them from obtaining ade-
quate knowledge;" 7 2) producers cannot determine which attributes
of a product (price, quality, environmental efficiency) were decisive
in stimulating a purchase;"' 3) a single price cannot adequately con-
vey reliable environmental information because the potential envi-
ronmental impacts along the production/use/disposal cycle of a
product are too numerous, and therefore consumers cannot distin-
guish environmental efficiency from other factors controlling
price;"' 4) difficulties in identifying and valuing externalities pro-
hibit their internalization by producers; 120 and 5) producers do not
possess the environmental information necessary to inform the con-
sumer; obtaining this information would be prohibitively expensive
114 See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
115 Latin, Environmental Deregulation and Consumer Decisionmaking Under Uncertainty,
6 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 187, 239 (1982).
116 See id. at 196-97, 200.
117 See id. at 189-90, 201-04.
118 See id. at 198-99.
119 See id. at 209-11.
120 See id. at 212.
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for producers and, even if they had it, there is no incentive to publish
i.121it.
t ~
These concerns are legitimate, but not insurmountable. Com-
bining the free market principle of individual decision making with
the strengths and efficiencies of governmental information-gathering
would meet these concerns and provide further benefits by manipu-
lating the demand side of the output equation.
12 2
A. The Environmental Impact Index
Congress could combine private decision making with govern-
mental information gathering by implementing a federal Environ-
mental Impact Index (EII): a numerical distillation of a product's or
package's impact on the environment as it is produced and dis-
carded.121 Motor oil and its plastic container can be used to illus-
trate this approach.
124
121 See id. at 218-19. That "manufacturers and industrial users of commercial
chemicals have little incentive to produce and distribute data about chemicals'
adverse effects and, indeed, even the identity of the chemicals," has been recognized
as an informational public health problem caused by market failure. Lyndon,
Information Economics and Chemical Toxicity: Designing Laws to Produce and Use Data, 87
MICH. L. REV. 1795, 1795-99 (1989). Professor Lyndon proposes that this market
failure can be corrected by linking public research costs to their private economic
origins by instituting a "super-study" research program, based on the Superfund
cleanup program, in which a national data system for toxicity information, funded by
taxing industry, could be designed. Id. at 1835-41.
122 See supra notes 107-13 and accompanying text.
123 Designing a system to encourage ecologically efficient use of a product or
package is a more difficult task and will not be attempted here. See generally Brooks,
Coercion to Environmental Virtue: Can and Should Law Mandate Environmentally Sensitive
Life Styles?, 31 AM.J.JuRIs. 21, 30-35 (1986) (discussing the difficulties of defining an
"ecologically sensitive lifestyle").
124 Motor oil affects the environment at all four stages of the production/
consumption/disposal cycle, see text accompanying note 79. The extraction process
of the raw materials involves exploration, drilling, production, transportation, and
storage. Environmental damage at this stage comes from chronic leaks and
discharges as well as from major accidents like the Exxon Valdez oil tanker disaster.
See Labaton, Does an Assault on Nature Make Exxon a Criminal?, N.Y. Times, Apr. 23,
1989, § 4, at 1, col. 4 (commenting on leak of 250,000 barrels of oil into Prince
William Sound).
Wastes from the process of refining crude oil include air pollutants, in the form
of carbon monoxides and dioxides from the heating of the oil; and hydrocarbon
vapor loss, from pipe and tank leaks and process exhausts. Contamination may also
come from dumping and accidental spills and leaks. M. CAMPBELL & W. GLENN,
PROFIT FROM POLLUTION PREVENTION: A GUIDE TO INDUSTRIAL WASTE REDUCTION &
RECYCLING 114 (1982). Plastic resins for the package are manufactured from
petroleum in reactions that generate 265,000,000 metric tons of hazardous waste
annually, with toxic chemicals comprising nearly one-tenth of that total. See
Commoner, supra note 1, at 52. The transformation of the resins and other materials
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The oil driller, oil refiner, plastic resin manufacturer, and plastic
bottle manufacturer (assuming that all four are separate entities, and
no vertical integration of the businesses has occurred) would come
to an Environmental Protection Agency whose mission would not be
to tell them the maximum allowable levels of pollutants they could
discharge into the environment, but rather to determine the impact
of their production processes on the environment. The EPA's new
role would make it look more like the FDA (Food and Drug Adminis-
tration) than the FBI, which it more resembles now. 125 The FDA
determines the impact of certain substances and processes on the
human body. Similarly, the EPA would determine the impact of cer-
tain substances and processes on the environment.
The administrative process, in fact, would parallel the FDA's
procedures for approving new drugs. 126 The oil driller, oil refiner,
resin manufacturer, and plastics producer would submit to the EPA
into plastic forms for final use yields air pollution and solid wastes. See M. CAMPBELL
& W. GLENN, supra, at 178-79.
The consumer fills her car's crankcase with oil and discards the container.
Although the use of the motor oil, absent leaks and spills, is typically non-polluting,
its disposal and the disposal of the plastic container create more environmental
problems. Of 350,000,000 gallons of oil drained from cars annually, only 14% is
recovered for reuse; the rest, laden with heavy metals and additives, flows into the
environment. See Brinkman, Used Oil: Resource or Pollutant, TECH. REV. July 1985, at
46, 48. The plastic bottles usually end up in landfills.
125 Of course the EPA, like the FDA or the FBI, would retain its role as a
regulator and enforcer for extremely toxic pollutants such as lead, mercury and PCBs
that are considered too dangerous to be allowed into the environment no matter
what the market might dictate. See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text; C.
SCHULTZE, supra note 5, at 53-54; Merrill & Schewel, FDA Regulation of Environmental
Contaminants of Food, 66 VA. L. REV. 1357, 1391-1423 (1980) (discussing FDA
decisionmaking in the regulation of mercury, aflatoxin, PBBs, and PGBs).
126 The FDA's approval process starts when a drug sponsor submits an
Investigational New Drug Application (IND) before tests on humans can begin. See
Farley, How FDA Approves New Drugs, FDA CONSUMER, Dec. 1987-Jan. 1988, at 7;
Sands, The FDA and New Product Development in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 12 BAYLOR
Bus. STUD. 7, 9 (1981). The FDA then reviews the application, which contains the
sponsor's results of drug tests on animals, and, within 30 days, either approves or
disapproves human testing. See Farley, supra, at 7; Sands, supra, at 9. After the tests
on humans are concluded, the sponsor then submits a New Drug Application (NDA)
containing all test results. See Farley, supra, at 7-9; Sands, supra, at 10. At this stage,
the FDA begins its in-depth review: chemists examine how the drug is put together;
pharmacologists evaluate its effects on animals; physicians review the clinical tests
and identify therapeutic effects; statisticians evaluate the test procedures; and other
scientists determine the drug's distribution, metabolization and elimination from the
body. See Farley, supra, at 11. After approval, the FDA reviews the drug's labeling,
promotion, and packaging, ensuring that statements of ingredients, structure,
mechanisms of action, dosages, toxicity, side effects, and interactions appear on the
new drug's labels, and that the packages themselves are non-toxic. See Sands, supra,
at 11-13.
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an environmental study or "environmental audit,"' 27 conducted by
either the firm's own experts or independent environmental impact
auditors. 128 The study or audit would be a "mass balance" audit that
127 Environmental audits are not new to the business sector. In 1971, the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), in Securities Act Release No. 33-5170,
36 Fed. Reg. 13,989 (1971), informed registered businesses that certain
environmental situations involving "significant capital outlays" potentially affecting
earning power must be disclosed. Additionally, the strict liability implications of
"Superfund" have caused a number of prudent businesses to seek environmental
audits to "minimize their long-term exposure to liability." Myers & McCaffery, The
Goals and Techniques of Environmental Audits, 30 PRAc. LAw. 41, 45 (1984) (suggesting
criteria for choosing environmental auditors, defining the scope of the audit, and
proposing a plan of study for an environmental audit that meets the SEC's disclosure
requirements while aiding corporations in defending against future environmental
liability claims).
"Superfund" is the common name for the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982)
(CERCLA).
CERCLA gives the government the authority to determine what sites or
situations constitute a danger to health and the environment. It then
permits the government to adopt various responses to address the
dangerous situation. One is the authority for the government to clean up
a site at which hazardous substances are being released that endanger
health or the environment, using Superfund to pay the costs. The
government may seek reimbursement of its response costs from
responsible parties under CERCLA. Lastly, the government may order
responsible parties to undertake cleanup at their expense.
F. SKILLERN, ENVRIONMENTAL PROTECTION: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK, § 5A.01 (Supp.
1988).
128 See Meyers & McCaffery, supra note 127, at 46. Trade secrets, of course,
would be purged from such audits or procedures would be adopted to maintain intra-
agency confidentiality of sensitive material.
Disclosures of information contained in Environmental Impact Statements
under the NEPA are subject to the Freedom of Information Act of 1967 (FOIA),
codified as part of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982). But
material in those statements classified as secret has been held exempt from disclosure
under FOIA's "governmental secrets" provision. See Weinberger v. Catholic Action,
454 U.S. 139, 143-45 (1981); see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1). Presumably, then,
information contained in the environmental audits proposed here similarly would be
protected from public disclosure under FOIA's "trade secrets" exclusion. 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b)(4).
Protection is also provided by the takings clause of the fifth amendment of the
Constitution. In "[o]ne of the few documented releases of commercially valuable
information," W. GELLHORN, C. BYSE, P. STRAuss, T. RAKOFF & R. SCHOTLAND, supra
note 58, at 770, unfortunately involving the EPA, the Supreme Court held that
commercially valuable trade secrets might be considered "property" under some
state law definitions, and their owners would receive "just compensation" if the trade
secrets were disclosed or used by the government for the benefit of others. See
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1000-04 (1984). "This conclusion
would apply where the trade secrets were 'property' under state law and federal law
created an expectation that submitted information would neither be disclosed nor
used in assessing other applicants, submissions to the agency without appropriate
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identifies and follows all materials used in production from the time
they enter the plant through processing, storage, transportation, dis-
position, and disposal.129 Additionally, waste streams throughout
the process would be identified, as well as the characteristics of the
local environmental media into which discharges flow. Methods of
waste management would also be described. To ensure that the pro-
ducer's application information was correct, the EPA could conduct
periodic audits or require periodic audits by certified independent
auditors, much as the SEC does for certain corporate financial
statements.
The producer's environmental audit, like the test results submit-
ted by a new drug sponsor to the FDA, would serve as an application
to the EPA for "approval" to produce and market its product. This
"approval," however, would typically be only the EPA's determina-
tion of the product's impact on the environment and the granting of
an Environmental Impact Index (ElI) number. °30 The ElI number
would come from the EPA's evaluation of the producer's application.
Government agencies have performed environmental impact
assessments of present and proposed activities in at least 25 states
and 16 other nations for nearly twenty years.' The Eli system
compensation." W. GELLHORN, C. BYSE, P. STRAuss, T. RAKOFF & R. SCHOTLAND,
supranote 58, at 770 (emphasis omitted).
129 The driller's environmental audit would be somewhat different: the
environmental impact of reaching the drill site, sinking the well, extracting,
transporting, storing and other residual damage following production completion
would need to be identified.
130 This would be the case unless, of course, the producer's application revealed
that especially dangerous toxic substances were involved. See supra note 125.
131 The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1982)
(NEPA) requires that: "(2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall . . .(C)
include in every recommendation .. .and other major Federal actions significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the
responsible official on-(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action."
Thus, since 1969, Congress has required that any
agency proposing to undertake action that may affect the quality of the
human environment . . . prepare a detailed [Environmental Impact]
statement . . . that describes the area to be affected, the adverse
environmental effects that can be avoided, reasonable alternatives and
their harmful effects, and possible mitigation measures or methods of
avoiding or minimizing harm.
F. SKILLERN, supra note 127, at § 2.04. Courts have interpreted this provision to
require a full disclosure of the environmental effects of proposed projects. See Envi-
ronmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 728, 743-44 (E.D.
Ark. 1971), vacated on other grounds, 342 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D. Ark.), aft'd, 470 F.2d 289
(8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1974). Successful applications of environ-
mental impact assessment processes include the use of impact statements to judge
the effects of allowing supersonic aircraft to land at Kennedy and Dulles airports and
1989]
534 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 138:505
would establish similar assessments, but evaluating the private man-
ufacture and disposal of products rather than public projects under-
taken by government.
The case of motor oil refining, for example, would require an
assessment of the environmental setting upon which the motor oil
would have an impact, as well as production and disposal issues.
13 2
Variables to be considered might include: life-form populations liv-
ing near the plant; habitats or land use of surrounding areas; land
quality and soil erosion; critical ecosystem relationships; threatened
or endangered species; water habitats; water quality and uses; water
quantity; air quality; climatology; noise; aesthetics; and historical and
archaeological considerations.1
3 3
After identifying the surrounding environmental variables,
impact prediction and assessment would be done. The EPA would
study how the activities, substances, and wastes identified in the oil
refiner's application would affect the above environmental vari-
ables.' 34 Assigning probabilities to alternative risk assessment sce-
narios can alleviate the uncertainty common to impact predictions in
which relevant physical and economic variables are unknown.1
3 5
Measurements, based on tests or past experience, of both the
identified environmental variables and the producer's pollution vari-
ables must be made.'3 6 These measurements may be based on tests,
recorded experience, or both. Quantitative or qualitative measure-
ments will be required depending upon the variable being
assessed.13 7 If the producer or product is new, predictions of poten-
tial impacts will be required. If the process being analyzed is estab-
lished, direct measurements should be possible. Finally, secondary
to determine the best route for the Trans-Alaska Pipeline for carrying natural gas.
See Baldwin, NEPA Symposium, 15 NAT. RESOURCES LAw. 605, 606 (1983). Since 1969,
at least 25 states and 16 other nations have adopted environmental impact review
provisions for governmental entities. See President's Address, in ENVIRONMENTAL QUAL-
rry: THE NINTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, at iv.
(1978).
132 See L. CANTER & L. HILL, HANDBOOK OF VARIABLES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT ASSESSMENT 1 (1979).
133 See id. at 4-11; R. JAIN, L. URBAN & G. STACEY, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
ANALYSIS: A NEw DIMENSION IN DECISION MAKING 39 (1977) [hereinafter
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ANALYSIS].
134 See L. CANTER & L. HILL supra note 132, at 1.
135 See Freeman, Risk Evaluation in Environmental Regulation, in REFORM OF
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 47, 53-56 (W. Magat ed. 1982).
136 See ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra note 133, at 61-70.
137 See id. at 64.
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and cumulative impacts must be weighed and the entire group of
measurements aggregated, summarized, and analyzed.'
The technology necessary to make these determinations and to
manage the data is available now and constantly improves.' Thus,
138 See id. at 22-33 (describing a step-by-step procedure for developing an
environmental impact assessment); ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND
MANAGEMENT 301-50 (C. Holling ed. 1978) (describing environmental impact
assessment techniques). There are a number of ways in which the EPA could assess
the environmental impact of particular activities. See Henshaw, The Impat Judgment: A
Technical Impasse?, in IMPROVING IMPACT ASSESSMENT: INCREASING THE RELEVANCE
AND UTILIZATION OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION 313, 316-17 (S. Hart,
G. Enk, & W. Hornick eds. 1984) (proposing a basic framework of seven "biosocial"
criteria for assessing the impact of different activities on the biosphere: "1) Is the
ecosystem unusual?; 2) How biological (sic) fit is the ecosystem?; 3) How productive
is the ecosystem?; 4) How much biological persistence would the ecosystem have?;
5) How long would it take to replace the ecosystem if destroyed?; 6) Are there
bioadministrative issues?; 7) Are there bioaesthetic issues?" Similar questions could
be asked concerning various aspects of the environment in order to perform a
complete impact assessment.).
139 Seegenerally IMPROVING IMPACT AssESSMENT: INCREASING THE RELEVANCE AND
UTILIZATION OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION (S. Hart, G. Enk & W.
Hornick eds. 1984) (collection of essays based on a project initiated by the Research
and Decision Center, reporting the results of a symposium on "Improving the
Quality and Utility of Scientific and Technical Information in EIS's");
ENVIRONMENTAL RISK ASSESSMENT (A. Whyte & I. Burton eds. 1980) (report by the
Scientific Committee on Problems of the Environment of the International Council
of Scientific Unions with the support of the United Nations Environment Programme
identifying and developing environmental risk assessment techniques); Carpenter,
supra note 63, at 581 (stating that "environmental science has advanced in the ways it
is applied and in the abilities of the scientists it attracts. Information about pollution
control, hazardous wastes management, renewable resources use, human health
effects, and other specific management areas now is satisfactory"). See also supra note
63 (discussing the tendency of science to create information and technology as
society demands it, and concluding that the type of environmental program chosen
will dictate the amount of scientific knowledge available); Lyndon, supra note 121, at
1798 ("Toxicology, computer science, and information management science ...
[allows us to] produce more information about toxicity and manage the data more
effectively than we could in the early 1970s, when the environmental regulatory
scheme was first established. New environmental technologies and service
professions have evolved .... ) (footnote omitted).
The existence of uncertainty continues to plague risk assessment. The public
that faces the consequences of uncertain environmental decisions must adequately be
informed so that "elite policymakers" will not make choices among competing
goods. Hattis & Kennedy, Assessing Risks from Health Hazards. An Imperfect Science, 89
TECH. REv. 60, 71 (1986) (stating that an informed public will have to accept
responsibility for choosing between competing goods and risks); see also Grad, Risk
Assessment and the Tyranny of Numbers: A Brief Comment, I ENVTL. L. & LITIGATION 1, 10
(1986) ("Risk assessment is a tool to help us make difficult decisions [but] ... it must
be examined in each instance to determine the reliability of the underlying data and
assumptions made...").
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assessing the impact of a product on the environment is realistically
achievable. 140
It is imperative that environmental impacts not be evaluated in a
vacuum.' 4 ' Before the EPA determines the environmental impact of
an activity,' 42 basic policy choices must be made concerning: 1) the
weight the information is to be given; 2) the method of identifying
significant environmental effects; and 3) the adequacy of the neces-
sary data.
1 43
The determination of the relative weights to be given to identi-
fied impacts on the various environmental variables would require
Congressional guidance. For example, "valuing" the reduction of
plant life or the decrease in air quality near an oil refinery is neces-
sarily a social policy, political decision. 14 Congress could devise a
hierarchy of social values to place on elements of the environment,
as a tool for the EPA's use in making evaluations.' 4 5 Linked to this
hierarchy, a "marginal impact scale" could be assigned to determine
the weight to be given an observed or predicted impact.' 46 Deci-
140 The same analysis used to determine a product's environmental impact
during production would be used to assess the impact of its disposal. A similar audit
would be required. The producer is best able to know or discover the
decompositional characteristics and environmental impact of disposal of its products,
and to design products and create methods of disposal that are environmentally
sound. As indicated later, there will be a strong incentive to create such methods and
products. See infra notes 171-81 and accompanying text.
141 See R. MELNICK, supra note 10, at 6-9 (stating that "[ilt is relatively easy to
delegate the task of achieving [fair and efficient pricing] to economists and other
experts. But experts cannot so readily claim to know whether.., the environment is
sufficiently healthy, enjoyable, or even aesthetically pleasing").
142 See ENVIRONMENTAL RISK AsSESSMErr, supra note 139, at xix (Defining an
enviromental impact determination as "a search for a 'best route' between social
benefit and environmental risk. It is a balancing or trading-off process in which
various combinations of risks are compared and evaluated against particular social or
economic gains.").
143 See id. at 72 (stating that there is dispute about what is a valid, relevant, and
acceptable basis for assessing risks based largely on differences as to what is a
"significant" effect and what is a scientifically adequate amount of data).
144 See Henshaw, supra note 138, at 313.
145 This hierarchy might already be in place given that the current regulatory
approach specifies ambient and performance standards that define the acceptable
amount of particular pollutants, thus defining a socially acceptable amount of
environmental degradation. Although often set by the EPA, such standards
presumably are established by determining the amount of damage a particular
pollutant causes, determining the level of environmental damage society accepts in
that area, and then setting the standard within these limits. See, e.g., supra notes 9-17
and accompanying text. Therefore, current ambient standards could function as a
guide to estimate society's valuing of a particular level of environmental degradation.
146 For example, even if an activity is determined to have a small impact on a
socially valuable environmental variable, Congress may nonetheless require the
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sions concerning the method of identifying significant impacts and
the amount of information required, however, would be made by the
EPA. This governmental body has the technological expertise to
evaluate options and adapt strategies to particular problems.
1 47
The EPA's analysis of the environmental impact must then be
transformed so that the average consumer will understand it. An
Environmental Impact Index could be designed to convert the EPA's
evaluations into a sliding numerical scale.' 41 A scale of zero to fifty,
for instance, could apply to manufacture and disposal, the two most
environmentally threatening stages of the product and package life
cycle. A score of zero would indicate little or no environmental
impact with fifty indicating a highly adverse impact. The product
label on a one quart container of oil, for example, might look like
this:
Brand X Motor Oil
Viscosity: 10-W-30 EII- Total 148
Price: $2.00 EII-Manu-prod 15
EII-Manu-pack 39
EII-Disp-prod 29
EII-Disp-pack 35
(EII-Manu-prod = the environmental impact during the manufac-
ture of the product; EII-Disp-prod = the environmental impact dur-
ing disposal of the product;149 pack = package; EII-Total = the
evaluator to give that impact great weight because of the value of the variable to
society.
147 See supra notes 125-38 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
technical analysis that must be undertaken in order to assess environmental impacts.
148 The EPA and the states currently perform environmental indexing in certain
situations. The EPA ranks some environmental risks using a verbal scale from
"high" to "low." See Morgenstern & Sessions, supra note 47, at 17. Air quality is
monitored and assessed by each state and reported to the general public each day by
way of a numerical Uniform Air Quality Index, ranging from 0 to 300, which is
converted into "descriptor words" for public dissemination: 0 to 50 = "good"; 51
to 100 = "moderate"; 101 to 199 = "unhealthful"; 200-299 = "very unhealthful";
300 and above = "hazardous." 40 C.F.R Part 58, App. G, at 186 (1988).
Indexing is a useful means to communicate complex technical information to a
public poorly versed in mathematics:
If the price of dog food or cake mix can be rationalized, why can't some
sort of rough "safety index" be devised which allows us to gauge how safe
various activities, procedures, and illnesses are? What I'm suggesting is a
kind of Richter scale which the media could use as a shorthand for
indicating degrees of risk.
J. PAULOS, INNUMERACY: MATHEMATICAL ILLITERACY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 94 (1988).
149 The ELI disposal value would represent the most common disposal method
available for the product. If more environmentally efficient methods were available
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total environmental impact of both the manufacture and disposal of
the product and package-the greatest impact value would equal
200.) 150
These numbers would convey information to the consumer in
familiar and recognizable ways, similar to information already
required' 5' or voluntarily provided by producers, such as: miles per
gallon (MPG) on automobiles; British Thermal Units (BTUs) on air
conditioners; ingredients and nutritional information on food prod-
ucts; dosage, ingredient, side effect, warning, and interaction infor-
mation on drugs; active/inert ingredients, accident avoidance, and
first aid information on dangerous cleansers and pesticides; content
tags on upholstery and bedding; and warnings on machinery.
Providing this information would create many of the environ-
mental benefits available through manipulation of the demand side
of the output equation, 52 while avoiding the obstacles to consumer
decision making identified by Professor Latin. 5 ' As mentioned pre-
viously, the demand for goods is affected by price, income, and by
changes in consumers' attitudes, needs, and related psychological
factors.' 54 Providing consumers with easily understandable EII
information would directly affect most of these decision making vari-
ables. Some producers are already utilizing environmental impact
information to increase sales.' 5 5 Because Americans overwhelm-
the Environmental Impact Tax would provide incentives to use them. See infra notes
171-81 and accompanying text.
150 Raw material and industrial product Ells would not be included in consumer
labeling information. Instead, the Eli for the various materials and industrial
products that make up a product would be indicated on packaging.
151 Federal law currently requires that chemical toxicity information be
disseminated. See Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act of 1986
(EPCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 11001 (Supp. V 1987); OSHA Hazard Communication
Standard, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (1988). Many foods and drugs subject to FDA
regulation must list their ingredients on labels. See Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301 (1982). Pesticides must be labeled with their
registration number and their active ingredients. See Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
152 See supra notes 106-13 and accompanying text.
153 See supra notes 115-21 and accompanying text.
154 See supra notes 84-91 and accompanying text.
155 Atlantic Richfield recently announced that it will offer a "cleaner" gasoline
called "EC-I" (Emission Control- 1) that is designed to cut emissions of benzene,
sulfur dioxide, and carbon monoxide. Zeidler, Arco Rivals Spurred by "Clean" Gas,
Phila. Inquirer, Aug. 30, 1989, at D8, col. 1. Oil analysts describe ARCO's new
product as "a marketing ploy that the others will have to follow." Id. (quoting
George Gaspar, oil analyst with Robert W. Baird). "Melitta, the world's largest
maker of coffee filters ... [realizing] that the bleach used to make white paper for its
filters posed potential environmental or health hazards . . . decided to introduce a
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ingly support environmental protection, consumers are likely to
adjust their purchases based on this information.
156
Commentators and some governmental and regulatory officials
are beginning to realize that further environmental improvements
are contingent upon changing the behavior of businesses and indi-
viduals.' 5 7 Providing the consumer with information about the con-
sequences of her demand for and use of products is a large step
line of brown, unbleached coffee filters" in the hope of increasing sales. Uhlman,
Cultivating the Consumer's Concern for Planet Earth, Phila. Inquirer, Sept. 4, 1989, at D-1,
col. 1. Manufacturers are also producing entire lines of green products:
"biodegradable trash bags, cereal packaged in recycled paperboard, and cake mix
with a reusable plastic baking dish .... Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. recently committed
itself to identifying for its consumers products that are improved environmentally."
Id. Boxes of AJAX laundry detergent now state: "The cleaning agents in AJAX are
biodegradable. This means that these ingredients are broken down into simpler
compounds by natural biological action. This capability helps to eliminate suds and
foaming problems in our lakes and streams." AJAX Laundry Detergent, Colgate-
Palmolive Co. The Kiplinger Washington editors have advised that companies are
beginning to market the environmental characteristics of products and are finding
that environmental consciousness sells. 66 KiPLINGER WASHINGTON LErER, Oct. 13,
1989.
156 One marketing firm
recently commissioned a national survey of 1000 adults that showed 89
percent were concerned about the environmental impact of the products
they purchased. More than half said they had decided not to buy a
product in the last year because of environmental concerns about it. And
8 out of 10 said they were willing to pay extra-ranging from 5 to 20
percent more-for a product packaged with recyclable or biodegradable
materials.
Uhlman, supra note 155. See also Commentary, Public Opinion on the Environment, 29
ENV'T 2 (1987) (letter by Michael McCloskey, Chairman of the Sierra Club, describ-
ing recent public opinion polls and calling environmental concerns "second-order"
issues in presidential campaigns); "Public is Willing to Pay Price "for Pure Air and Water,
U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Jul. 8, 1985, at 41, 42 (statement by Lee Thomas, Admin-
istrator, EPA, that Americans are "willing to pay the price" for environmental protec-
tion). Evidence of the public's concern for the environment is also evident in the
increasing number of citizen's suits seeking enforcement of environmental laws. See
supra note 72 and accompanying text. But see Francis, Attitudes Toward Industrial Pollu-
tion, Strategies for Protecting the Environment, and Environmental-Economic Trade-offs, 13 J.
OF APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 310, 326 (1983) (stating that "[a]lthough environmen-
tal concern is considerable, perceived costs of pollution abatement activities appear
to be impeding action," and job security is a primary concern).
157 See O'Riordan, The Earth as Transformed by Human Action: An International
Symposium, ENV'T. Jan.-Feb. 1988, at 25, 27. (noting that the consumer and the
"dispersed points of disposal from consumption" are not well-monitored); Russell,
supra note 20, at 12 (" 'The environmental movement as a whole is increasingly
coming to realize that we can no longer make major gains by forcing people to put
widgets on smokestacks of plants.' "); Kolata, How Much is Too Much to Pay to Meet
Standards for Smog?, N.Y. Times, Apr. 3, 1989, at Al, col. 1 (" 'To get significant
reductions now means changing a number of behaviors'" because the easily
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toward accomplishing this goal. Equipped with a standardized basis
of comparison, many consumers would choose more environmen-
tally efficient products. For example, motor oil packaged in a card-
board container might have a lower EII value than the same product
packaged in plastic. Market stratification on the basis of environ-
mental attributes, in addition to price and quality, would be
encouraged as producers adjusted to meet the new direction of con-
sumer demand.
This use of EIIs would induce producers to lower their EII num-
bers in order to make their products more marketable. Lower EIIs
could be achieved by: 1) reducing the environmental impact of man-
ufacturing a product;' 58 2) shifting to packaging manufactured with
less environmental harm; 3) developing products and packages less
harmful upon disposal; and 4) by developing more efficient disposal
and recycling methods. Regulatory enforcement expense would
decrease as producers began to gain economically from compliance.
A producer who developed new production processes to reduce
harmful environmental impact could re-petition the EPA by submit-
ting a new audit to modify its EII.159 The re-evaluation process
controllable sources already have controls. (quoting Alex Cristofaro, director of the
atmospheric and economic analysis division of the EPA)).
"The air-pollution control plan adopted by government and regulatory officials
[in Southern California] last month would force businesses to confront the
environmental impact of their operations more directly than ever before."
Stevenson, Facing Up to a Clean-Air Plan: Southern California's Visionary Challenge, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 3, 1989, at D1, col. 3. That plan attempts to alter consumer as well as
producer behavior: paints and coatings would have to be reformulated with
consumers paying a surcharge for products not meeting the new standards, all
aerosol sprays would be abolished, all charcoal broiling would be regulated, bias-ply
tires would be banned, bakeries, dry cleaners, and breweries would be required to
reduce emissions, and even gasoline engines on lawnmowers would be banned. See
id.
158 Reducing the environmental impact of manufacturing is already possible
and lucrative. See M. ROYSTON, POLLUTION PREvENTION PAYS 168 (1979) (pollution
prevention is possible though a systems approach to technology, integrated
production systems, recycling of wastes, and a merging of economics and technology
incorporating consideration of the surrounding environment and community);
MAKING POLLUTION PREVENTION PAY ix (D. Huisingh & V. Bailey eds. 1982)
(reporting industry successes in pollution reduction through more efficient
processes, better waste management and recycling, and stating that pollution is
symptomatic of inefficient technologies that "waste resources, degrade the
environment, and are unprofitable").
159 A current EPA program designed to decrease pollution by targeting
consumer demand, and which employs a similar re-petitioning process, is the "gas
guzzler" tax on certain cars. See infra notes 173-80 and accompanying text. Under
that program, importers of automobiles that have not been given a fuel economy
rating by the EPA may rebut the presumption of lowest fuel economy rating for
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would be more easily traversed than the original analysis because
baseline information on the producer and the environment would be
available. Accumulating baseline information on environmental vari-
ables and relevant societal impacts would create economies of scale
making new analyses more accurate and efficient while simultane-
ously increasing society's general understanding of the biosphere. 
160
Creating environmental sensitivity in consumer demand would
foster individual decision making and control by allowing consumers
to register preferences.1 61 A consumer "vote" for an environmen-
tally efficient product, however, would ultimately be driven by ideo-
logical and ethical considerations.1 62  Not all consumers and
producers would make environmentally motivated choices. There-
fore, society must command more influence over these decisions in
order to achieve its environmental goals. Society can gain this influ-
ence by altering prices to reflect environmental impact.
purposes of the gas guzzler tax. This method is similar to the recommended
reevaluation procedure or any challenge of an ElI designation. Rev. Proc. 86-9,
1986-1 C.B. 530 provides that where an importer believes that the presumption of
lowest fuel economy is inappropriate, it may, at its own expense, test that vehicle at
an EPA-recognized laboratory. Rev. Proc. 87-10, 1987-1 C.B. 545 provides that an
importer may also rebut the presumption by using the EPA-recognized fuel economy
ratings from a different vehicle of the same year, make, model, and engine. Similarly,
rebutting an EPA-designated ElI might involve reauditing the production process at
the producers' expense and might use already available relevant information.
160 Although "each environmental situation has some unique features.., most
ecological systems face a variety of natural disturbances and all organisms face some
common problems." Thus, each new assessment is not totally unique; there are
"relevant background principles, information . . .[and] comparable past cases."
ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT supra note 138, at 3. As
more activities are analyzed to determine their impacts and more measurements are
made of relevant environmental variables, baselines of information will grow and the
process will become more efficient. This accumulation of information might lead to a
"national information data system" similar to that proposed by Professor Lyndon for
chemical toxicity. See Lyndon, supra note 121, at 1825-35.
161 See Lyndon, supra note 121, at 1796 ("Toxicity information is necessary for
intelligent private choices, as well as for the protection of public health.").
162 See Sagoff, We Have Met the Enemy and He Is Us or Conflict and Contradiction in
Environmental Law, 12 ENVTL. L. 283, 286 (1982) (noting that one problem with
economic techniques of cost-benefit analysis is that they may fail to allow consumers
to register their ideological or ethical convictions).
The influence of environmental consciousness may be weakest in the context of
industrial products. Producers are likely to choose among equally useful industrial
products and raw materials on the basis of price alone. Therefore, the ElI alone
would not be effective for such products and materials, but would be extremely
effective when combined with an Environmental Impact Tax.
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B. The Environmental Impact Tax
The surest way for society to control the price of goods is with a
sales tax. Under the proposed system, such a tax would be used to
guide consumer demand toward environmentally efficient products
and packages. Before this approach is developed, however, a brief
word on what this type of tax would not be is in order.
Most proposals to use incentives to control pollution have called
for one of the following approaches: an effluent charge system,' 63 a
marketable permit system, 164 a direct incentive producer subsidy sys-
tem, 165 or an effluent tax system based on revenue needs.' 66 The tax
proposed here, however, does not share many similarities with these
approaches. Instead, the Environmental Impact Tax (EIT) more
closely resembles a "pure" pollution tax in that it would be based on
the damage or social cost of pollution,' 67 and would be targeted at
consumers as well as producers; that is, all polluters. Although the
EIT is neither a "value-added tax,"' 68 a "user fee" tax, 169 nor a fed-
163 See supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text. Although an effluent charge
system may be based on the social costs of pollution, the difference between such a
system and the EIT is that the EIT focuses on consumers as well as producers.
164 Under this approach, the government would issue a limited number of
permits allowing the discharge of particular pollutants. The permits would be issued
to the highest bidder and might be traded on a "permits market." See J. DIMENTO,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND AMERICAN BUSINESS 59 (1986).
165 This system would pay the polluter not to pollute through either direct
grants or tax subsidies. See P. BURROWS, supra note 101, at 99; C. REESE, supra note
18, at 410-12.
166 Effluent taxes are similar to effluent charges in that they might be based on
the quantity of effluent discharged. These tax systems, however, are often based on
the revenue needs of the government imposing them. See C. REESE, supra note 18, at
412-15.
167 See id. at 412.
168 A value-added tax is a tax "imposed at successive stages of production and
distribution on total consumer spending in the domestic economy. The
characteristic feature of the tax on added value, which distinguishes it from a retail
sales tax, is its imposition on all transactions at every stage of production and
distribution in domestic commerce." Fuller, The Proposed Value-Added Tax and the
Question of Tax Refon, 34 RUTGERS L. REV. 50, 51 (1981).
The EIT differs from this tax in that, although it would be imposed on industrial
products and consumer goods, there would be no refund as the product passes down
the distribution stream-each consumer of a product would pay for the
environmental impact of her consumption. A finished product might thus be taxed at
various stages so that the full cost of the environmental impact at each stage is
recovered.
169 "User fees are prices a governmental agency charges for a service or product
whose distribution it controls." Gillette & Hopkins, Federal User Fees: A Legal and
Economic Analysis, 67 B.U.L. REV. 795, 796 (1987).
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eral sales or consumption tax, 17 0 it does share some characteristics
with each of these taxes.
The EIT would be tied directly to the "EII-Total" value which
represents, as a unit, the product's and package's total environmen-
tal impact during manufacture and disposal. Like the EII, the EIT
would be, in form, a progressive scale that increases as environmen-
tal impact increases. For example, the tax rate scale tied to the EII-
Total value might look like this:
Products with an "EII-Total" value of:
0-50 = no EIT imposed
51-100 = EIT of 2% of purchase price
101-150 = EIT of 4% of purchase price
151-200 = EIT of 6% of purchase price
The motor oil mentioned above would thus have a 4% federal
environmental tax imposed on its purchase price because its EII-
Total value was 148.
An Environmental Impact Tax would ensure that the benefits of
manipulating the demand side of the output equation' 71 accrued to
society. Because goods identified as less environmentally efficient
would cost more, the quantity demanded of these products would
decline while the demand for less costly substitute products would
increase. '
72
Attempting to control producer behavior by increasing product
prices through taxation is not untested. The Gas Guzzler Tax,'
73
created by the Carter administration during the energy crisis of the
1970s, is a progressive tax similar to the EIT in that automobiles are
taxed at a higher rate as fuel economy, determined by the EPA,
174
declines.' 75 Similarity with the EIT does not end there; the National
170 "Consumption taxes, of which the most familiar variety in the United States
is the retail sales tax, are levies on individuals' consumption expenditures as opposed
to their incomes." Schuyler, Consumption Taxes: Promises & Problems, 25 TAX NOTES
571, 571 (1984). See also Zodrow, A Direct Consumption Tax as an 'Add-On' Tax, 38 TAX
NOTES 1389, 1391-95 (1988) (discussing the mechanics and merits of a consumption
tax).
171 See supra notes 106-14 and accompanying text.
172 The size of such adjustments would depend, in part, upon the demand
elasticities for each product and its available substitutes. Thus, control of producer
behavior through manipulation of the demand curve would be inexact.
173 I.R.C. § 4064 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
174 I.R.C. § 4064(c) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). There are special procedures for
vehicles imported into the United States without a fuel economy rating assigned by
the EPA. See Rev. Proc. 86-9, 1986-1 C.B. 530.
175 See Gensler, Energy Tax Policy, 5 NORTHROP U. L. J. AEROSPACE ENERGY &
ENV'T 41, 48-49 (1984).
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Energy Conservation Policy Act' 7 6 requires that vehicles subject to
the Gas Guzzler Tax must bear a statement of that tax on the vehi-
cle's fuel economy label so that gas guzzlers can be identified.'
77
The tax was proposed to spur automakers to comply with the fleet-
wide fuel efficiency standards mandated by the Energy Policy and
Conservation Act of 1975.178
As expected with taxes that increase product prices, wealthier
individuals are better able to meet the added cost burden and can
enjoy the product regardless of the tax. The typical consumer, how-
ever, and manufacturers catering to the typical consumer, must
change their behavior. Today, the only cars consistently drawing the
gas guzzler tax are a relatively small number of high-priced, high-
powered imports.' 79 Most carmakers, however, have increased their
average fuel economy ratings.18 0 The gas guzzler tax might be con-
sidered a truly progressive tax in that it taxes only the wealthy. The
tax is successful because congressional fuel economy goals have
been met for the vast majority of automobiles by using price incen-
tives that influence producers and consumers to alter their behavior
in a way beneficial to society.
The EIT would work in a similar manner for all products. The
price added to environmentally inefficient goods would push both
industrial and individual consumers to demand lower-cost, more
environmentally efficient goods, thereby forcing producers to meet
the demand. As with the gas guzzler tax approach, those goods
which the government hopes to reduce or eliminate would still be
available, but at increased cost-no regulatory ban would be
176 15 U.S.C. § 2006 (1982).
177 See EPA Fuel Economy of Motor Vehicles, 40 C.F.R. § 600.306 (1989).
Although the Gas Guzzler Tax is levied on the manufacturer and thus is not a sales
tax, the car's label includes the EPA's fuel economy value for the car as well as the gas
guzzler tax. The effect on the consumer is similar to the effect of a sales tax on fuel
economy.
178 42 U.S.C. § 6201 (1982). See also Rankin, Gas Guzzler Tax, 35 CONG. Q. 2560
(1985) (relating the congressional estimate that by 1985, 175,000 barrels of oil per
day would be saved by the tax and federal budget receipts would increase by $1
billion).
179 "The gas-guzzler tax and corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) tax may
account for between $2,800 to $3,800 of the price difference between the gray
market [imported automobiles not purchased in the U.S. from manufacturer-
authorized dealers and thus not subject to the gas guzzler tax] and authorized sales of
automobiles." Staaf, The International Gray Market. The Nexus of Vertical Restraints, Price
Discrimination and Foreign Law, 19 U. MIAMI INT'L-AM. L. REV. 37, 92 (1987).
180 See Shabecoff, Detroit Says Efficiency Has Gone Far Enough, N.Y. Times, Mar. 12,
1989, § 4, at 6, col. 2 (stating that mileage per gallon of cars and light trucks nearly
doubled between 1975 and 1985).
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imposed.'"' Certain extremely dangerous pollutants and processes,
however, would remain controlled or prohibited through direct
regulation.'
82
Critics might argue that the EIT would allow the wealthy to pol-
lute the environment while the poor carried the burden of conserva-
tion.'13 This argument fails to recognize, however, that the wealthy
would pay for the damage their consumption inflicts upon society,
just as they pay for the reduced gas mileage of their cars, the luxuri-
ous materials in their homes, and the fine tailoring of their clothes.
A free market economy allows each to consume, according to her
resources, in the way she desires.
Compared to the current regulatory approach, the EIT would
offer a number of advantages. Both the ElI and EIT would deliver
producers from the difficult position in which they find themselves
under the direct regulatory and charge approaches. Producers
would no longer feel the "Catch-22" dilemma whereby complying
with government limits or charges on emissions increases product
costs, resulting in price increases that hurt sales. The EII-EIT sys-
tem would force consumers to internalize the cost of environmental
waste and would remove the economic incentives for producers to
pollute.
As consumers refuse to purchase more expensive, environmen-
tally inefficient products, producers will develop goods that will
enjoy a lower tax rate. The methods of achieving a lower EIT would
181 Before passage of the gas guzzler tax, a ban on the production of gas
guzzling cars had been passed by the Senate-the tax replaced the ban. See Rankin,
supra note 178.
182 See supra note 125.
183 The regressivity of the EIT as a sales tax might also be an issue. Many
economists argue that sales and value-added taxes are regressive in that "in any
particular year, low-income families will on average consume a higher fraction of
their income than will high-income families." Thus a greater proportion of a low-
income family's yearly income would be consumed by the tax than a family with
greater income. R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGAVE, supra note 98, at 446; see also Zodrow,
supra note 170, at 1395. Notwithstanding this view, "[O]pinion polls show that the
public now ranks them [sales taxes] as one of the fairest and least onerous taxes in
this country." Schuyler, supra note 170, at 573. Professor Krauss has argued that
consumption taxes are not regressive when viewed over an individual's lifetime,
because life income will equal lifetime consumption for both the rich and poor. See
Krauss, A U.S. Sales Tax Would Be Preferable to a Value-Added Tax, 10 TAx NoTEs 131,
131-32 (1980).
Much of the potential regressivity of consumption taxes can be overcome in
large part by exempting certain essential items from the tax (e.g. basic foods) or by
permitting a tax-free amount of expenditure by allowing a credit against personal
income tax.
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be the same as achieving a lower EII. With the EIT, however, con-
sumers, too, would feel a direct incentive to reduce the environmen-
tal impact of the goods that they purchase.
As mentioned earlier, the EII "disposal-product" and "disposal-
package" values would roughly equal the environmental impact of
the most commonly used disposal method for the particular product
or package.' 84 For example, if used motor oil typically was injected
into the earth or washed down the drain, and used plastic bottles
most often wound up in landfills, the EII would reflect these disposal
methods. If, however, the consumer took her used oil and empty
plastic bottle to an environmentally efficient disposal firm or
recycler, 185 the EII and thus the EIT would be reduced.
To compensate the consumer for this behavior, a receipt could
be given to the consumer which she could use to gain an "Environ-
mental Disposal Tax Credit" on her federal income tax. 186 For con-
sumers unable to use such an income tax credit (lower income
individuals) the receipt could be used by filing a federal "Rebate for
Environmentally Efficient Disposal" form at the end of the year.
This would bring the consumer a rebate check. These credits and
rebates would be the federal equivalent of the successful "bottle
bills" or "deposit laws" implemented by various states.' 8 7 The
184 See supra note 149.
185 Approximately 14% of the one billion gallons of used lubricants generated
each year are currently recycled, yet the technology exists to economically make all of
these "wastes" as good as new. See Brinkman, supra note 124, at 47-49. The situation
is worse for plastics; less than one percent of post-consumer plastic wastes are
recovered annually. See Powell, The Year in Review, RESOURCE RECYCLING, Mar.-Apr.
1987, at 27. However, the technology is available to recycle most plastic wastes at
both an energy and cost savings, see M. CAMPBELL & W. GLENN, PROFIT FROM
POLLUTION PREVENTION: A GUIDE TO INDUSTRIAL WASTE REDUCTION AND RECYCLING
186-98 (1982); Stephens, The Case For HDPE Recycling, RESOURCE RECYCLING, Sep.-
Oct. 1987, at 18, 48.
The recycling industry is presently capable of recycling a wide variety of
resources: iron and steel, glass containers, textiles, tires, plastics, non-ferrous metals
such as aluminum, copper, zinc, stainless steel, and waste paper. See Powell, supra, at
26-27, 46.
186 Energy tax credits such as those in I.R.C. §§ 44C, 44D, 44E, and 46, which
attempt to reduce the need for oil and increase the production of oil substitutes,
seem to "cohesively and coherently further the national energy policy of conserving
oil." Gensler, supra note 175, at 50. Although energy is not being targeted under this
Environmental Disposal Tax Credit proposal, similar results might be achieved when
applying it to encourage national efficiency in the disposal of products and packages.
187 See Parkinson, supra note 1, at 65 (discussing the savings and environmental
impact of container legislation); see also Kahle & Beatty, Cognitive Consequences of
Legislating Postpurchase Behavior: Growing Up with the Bottle Bill, 17 J. APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOLOGY 828, 840 (1987) ("Legislation promoting the collective good, such as
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"refunds on deposit" would be given only once a year and would
come directly from the government rather than from each disposal
firm. The amount of the credit or rebate could be based on the
amount of the resource disposed in a more efficient manner, or on
the value of the disposing or recycling firm's ElI value subtracted
from the "product-disposal" or "package-disposal" ElI value of the
item being discarded.
This federal EII-based disposal system would create an incentive
for consumers to choose more efficient disposal methods for their
discarded products and packages. Additionally, the manufacturing
and recycling industries would have an incentive either to design
products that can be disposed of with reduced environmental impact
or to make recycling and disposal technology more efficient and
more widely available.
The overall effect of the EIT, like the Eli, would be to allow the
consumer to make her own decisions on the basis of easily under-
standable information concerning the product's price, quality, and
environmental impact. Admittedly, consumers will demand many
products regardless of this information, but such decisions would be
made individually. No government administrator would mandate a
decision based on assumed collective preferences and on virtually
unintelligible environmental, economic, and technical information.
Given greater information concerning the basis for purchase deci-
sions, producers would continually reduce their impact on the envi-
ronment in order to meet the economic and ideological demands of
consumers. Finally, the revenue raised from the EIT would fund the
ElI review process and the EIT Tax Credit for recycling, as well as
other environmental projects including cleanup efforts and environ-
mental research.
Implementing the EII-EIT system would, of course, take place
over time; the current regulatory approach would remain until the
system was fully operational. The direct regulation of toxic sub-
stances would always remain in place.
CONCLUSION
As knowledge of the environment continues to grow, we realize
that many activities we once assumed to be harmless adversely affect
the things that sustain life. What we do with this knowledge will
bottle bill legislation, can be effectively implemented . . .by stressing . . . the
receptivity of 'significant others' in the community to these laws.").
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determine which, if any, environmental goals we achieve and, ulti-
mately, will determine the quality of life.
Today, most of this knowledge is trapped in a centralizec~deci-
sion making agency which applies it through a system of direct iegu-
lations. A limited number of people deal with the knowledge, and a
limited number of results are achieved. Like the fish mentioned at
the beginning of this Comment, our existence is dangerously depen-
dent. Our lives depend on the decisions made by this small group of
people.
The Environmental Impact Index / Environmental Impact Tax
system, however, would combine the knowledge possessed by this
centralized agency with knowledge available in the private sector.
Under the proposed system, this information would be disseminated
among those decision makers most directly affected by its utilization
or non-utilization: consumers. Society would use the Environmental
Impact Tax to persuade these consumers to make environmentally
sensitive decisions. In this way, consumers, producers, government,
and society would all share common goals and objectives. Perhaps,
using this system, control of the things of life can be returned to us
all for the benefit of us all.
